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From the editors
Twenty years on from the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, the consequences of conflict – including the long-term effects of 
displacement – are still being felt in the Western Balkans. 
This issue of FMR focuses largely on the question of return. Some of those who 
were driven from their homes have been unable to return; others have returned 
but have struggled to rebuild their lives. The Agreement may have brought an  
end to war but its implementation has not yet put an end to human suffering  
and social crisis. 
As one of our authors says, “Twenty years on, the return project is ready for 
review.” This is an appropriate moment to examine the particular case of people 
who were displaced from and within Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of 
the 1992-95 war, and to reflect on the lessons that may be drawn from the 
successes and failures of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These lessons have 
resonance for current crises – such as in Syria or Ukraine – and merit attention.  
We would like to thank Selma Porobic (Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, 
University of Sarajevo) and Erin Mooney (United Nations Protection Capacity/
ProCap) for their assistance as advisors on the feature theme of this issue. 
We are also grateful to Catholic Relief Services-USCCB, the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs and UNHCR’s Regional Bureau for Europe for  
their financial support. 
FMR 50 also includes a number of ‘general’ articles on: safe shelters for 
survivors of SGBV, inconsistencies in asylum appeal adjudication in the UK, 
assisted voluntary return of young Afghans, refugees’ perspectives on successful 
resettlement in the US, and the fragmentation of the protection landscape. 
(Please note that all our ‘general’ articles are also now gathered together online, 
at www.fmreview.org/general-articles.) 
The full issue and all the individual articles in this issue are online in html, pdf 
and audio formats at www.fmreview.org/dayton20. Please help disseminate 
this issue by circulating to networks, mentioning it on Twitter and Facebook and 
adding it to resources lists. 
This issue (and its accompanying expanded contents summary) will be available 
online in English, Arabic, French, Spanish and Bosnian (both Latin and Cyrillic 
alphabets). However, due to shortage of funds, FMR 50 will be available in print 
in English, Arabic and Bosnian only. 
Please email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk if you would like printed copies.
Forthcoming issues:  
‘Destination: Europe’ – Due out December 2015. This issue will discuss the 
complexities of the European asylum debate, placing it in its broader context. 
‘Thinking ahead: displacement, transition and solutions’ – Due out May 2016.  
For more details, see www.fmreview.org/forthcoming. 
Join us on Facebook or Twitter or sign up for our occasional email alerts at  
www.fmreview.org/request/alerts. 
Marion Couldrey and Maurice Herson 
Editors, Forced Migration Review
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Foreword: Addressing the legacy of violence
Valentin Inzko
The devastation orchestrated by political, 
military and paramilitary leaders a 
generation ago continues to exert a 
malicious influence on the Western 
Balkans region long after many of those 
responsible have been convicted for their 
crimes. Just as the legacy of rape, murder 
and genocide committed during the 
conflict has left the region deeply scarred, 
so has the ideology of ethno-territorial 
nationalism poisoned its societies.
This is the complex subject explored 
in this issue of Forced Migration Review. 
Contributions reflect lessons learned and 
insights gained from practitioner and 
researcher engagement in the Western 
Balkans over the last 20 years. This 
practice-oriented approach offers us a 
tool to be more effective in tackling the 
problems the international community 
faces in this region and beyond, and this 
is why this work has my strong support. 
Combating ethnic division
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aim of 
creating ethnically homogeneous statelets 
was curbed at Dayton but the dominance 
of ethnic politics was not. In many ways it 
was entrenched. While the Dayton Peace 
Agreement explicitly provides for the return 
of all refugees and displaced persons to their 
pre-war homes and requires the authorities 
to uphold and facilitate this process, it 
also relies on the goodwill of authorities 
who often perceive their political interest 
to be in maintaining ethnic division. 
Substantial numbers of people have 
exercised their right to return – it is 
important to remember this success. But 
it is also true that powerful elites have 
continued to resist the reintegration of 
the country, clearly acting outside the 
provisions of the constitutional settlement. 
Public officials – from municipal clerks 
to those in high office – have obstructed 
return. Indeed, in the decade after the war, 
High Representatives had to intervene 
robustly to end this obstruction. But 
something else was also at play: an effort 
to cement ethnicity as a single social and 
political building block. This is a policy 
we must continue to push back on.
In many cases, those who have 
tried to consolidate the results of forced 
migration appear to believe that their 
efforts are principled. They have accepted 
the argument that people with different 
customs and beliefs cannot live peacefully 
together. They are wrong. Their vision, their 
narrative, runs counter to the conclusive 
evidence from other parts of the world 
that societies that encompass complex and 
intermingled identities can and do thrive. It 
also flies in the face of the historical record 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a society which 
for centuries was a model of successful 
– often fruitful – coexistence among 
different religions and cultural traditions. 
I believe that the irrational acceptance 
of a principle of divisiveness underpins 
many of the problems discussed in the 
following pages. The forced migration 
– ‘ethnic cleansing’ – conducted in the 
Western Balkans during the 1990s has not 
been fully and universally understood as a 
moral as well as a political failure, and its 
legacy of suspicion and spite continues to 
frustrate efforts to reverse the demographic 
distortions created by violence. This 
core challenge is one that will need to 
be faced ever more directly in future.
Many of the people of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, working with the active 
support of the international community, 
are determined to address this political 
challenge and we owe it to them and to 
the victims of the war and of course to 
future generations to continue to support 
them. It is a long hard struggle but one 
that, I am certain, will in the long term 
see reintegration triumph over division. 
Valentin Inzko, High Representative to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. For more information, please 
contact sarajevo.rd@ohr.int.  
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The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The General Framework Agreement, also known as the Dayton Accords, Dayton Peace 
Agreement, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached 
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, in the United States, in November 
1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. This Agreement put an end to the 
Bosnian war that had started in April 1992. 
The political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) created by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement comprise two ‘entities’ – the Federation of BiH, with mostly Bosniaks and  
Croats as its ‘constituent peoples’, and the Republika Srpska, with mostly Serbs – plus,  
since 1999, Brčko District as a self-governing administrative unit under the sovereignty  
of BiH. 
The text of the Agreement is online at www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379
Original: Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock.com
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Annex 7: why are we still discussing it?  
María del Pilar Valledor Álvarez
Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement was designed to address the displacement of  
2.2 million people during the Bosnian war of 1992-95. Its job is not yet done.
The clash of separatist and ethnic interests 
in the Balkans led to a war that began in early 
1992 and in which the use of violence against 
civilians shocked the world. It was during 
this conflict that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
was coined to describe the use of torture, 
rape, indiscriminate killings, internment in 
prison camps and the expulsion of thousands 
of civilians from their homes and towns 
in order to achieve ethnic ‘purity’. It is 
estimated that 263,000 people died and more 
than two million people – out of a pre-war 
population of 4.4 million – were displaced.  
Of the displaced, about a million 
remained in the country and up to 1.2 million 
fled to other countries. Germany received 
some 350,000 refugees, Croatia about 300,000 
and Austria 80,000, followed by Slovenia with 
more than 33,000 and Switzerland with almost 
27,000. The Netherlands and Denmark took 
in some 23,000 refugees each, and the United 
Kingdom and Norway 12,000 and 13,000 
respectively. Some 610,000 of the refugees 
were Bosniaks, 307,000 Bosnian Croats, 
253,000 Bosnian Serbs and 23,000 others.
The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed  
on 21st November 1995, brought the war to  
an end.
Annex 7 to the Peace Agreement was 
designed to be key to the future stability of 
the region as it recognised the right of all 
displaced people to return to their homes 
of origin, or to receive compensation for 
property to which, for whatever reason, 
they could not return. Furthermore, the 
parties to the Agreement were required 
to implement a repatriation plan to be 
drawn up by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. They had to 
commit to provide the necessary assistance 
and take the necessary political, economic 
and social measures to ensure the voluntary 
return of refugees and displaced persons. 
An independent commission, based in 
Sarajevo, would be responsible for settling 
property and compensation claims. But four 
years of war had left a legacy of distrust 
that ended the hope that those who had 
been displaced would easily or readily 
return to live side by side in peace. 
Continuing discrimination and 
displacement
This climate of mistrust and fear between 
different ethnic groups continued, and 
many refused to return home. Of those who 
did return, many suffered discrimination 
in trying to access the labour market or 
other public services such as health or 
education. The protection of returnees 
and their homes, especially in the case 
of minorities, was essential to ensure the 
initial success of the repatriation, and more 
active involvement of the multinational 
peacekeeping force (SFOR) deployed after 
the war could have been instrumental in 
increasing the number of returnees at this 
early stage. To all these difficulties was added 
the pressure on some European countries 
to repatriate hundreds of thousands of 
Bosnian refugees despite the shortage of 
funds to rebuild damaged homes, build 
new ones or finance compensation claims.
The limited success of the implementation 
of Annex 7 has its origin in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement itself, in the negotiators 
and signatories who entrusted the security 
of return of minorities to the same 
authorities who had ordered their ethnic 
cleansing during the war. The signing of 
the Peace Agreement ended the war but 
after twenty years thousands of people 
are still displaced and solutions to the 
legacy of the war are still needed. 
María del Pilar Valledor Álvarez 
pvalledora@yahoo.es 
Doctor of Law from the Universidad Rey  
Juan Carlos.
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Political and social consequences of continuing 
displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Lana Pašić
Twenty years after Dayton, failures to facilitate effective refugee and IDP return have had a 
social and political impact at both community and state level. 
The 1990s wars in the Balkans triggered 
large-scale displacement within the region. 
Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia hosted 
about 40% of the refugees from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), while Austria, Germany, 
Canada, the United States and Australia 
also received large numbers. One hundred 
thousand people died in the conflict and two 
million people – almost half the population 
of BiH – were displaced, one million of 
whom were internally displaced. Although 
the peace agreement signed in Dayton, 
Ohio, on 21 November 1995 made provision 
for the return of refugees and IDPs to their 
place of origin, 20 years on the impact of 
displacement still affects the social fabric, 
political context and economy of the country.
The first two years following the war 
saw large numbers of people returning 
from abroad – but mainly to the areas 
where their ethnic group was dominant 
(known as ‘majority returns’). ‘Minority 
returns’ – displaced people who would now 
be ethnically in the numerical minority 
in their areas of origin – only picked up 
in the early 2000s, and by the mid-2000s it 
was clear that most of the ‘returns’ were 
fictional. People returned and registered in 
their place of origin solely for the purpose of 
reclaiming and then selling their property, 
after which they moved back to areas where 
their ethnic group was in the majority. 
This was particularly clear in the case of 
Serbs in Sarajevo, who tended to re-settle 
in the predominantly Serb part of the city, 
which is part of the Republika Srpska. 
Some of the displaced choose not to return 
because of past traumas and a continuing 
feeling of insecurity, others because of 
an absence of economic opportunities. 
Displaced populations often experience 
high rates of poverty and limited access 
to social and health services. They may 
not be able to finance their return or the 
reconstruction of their pre-conflict homes; 
furthermore, finding a job and reintegrating 
into the economy where there already is 
a staggeringly high unemployment rate 
is particularly difficult for a person from 
a minority ethnic group. When returns 
occur, it is often the older and economically 
inactive population that moves back, which 
affects the dynamic of community life and 
in turn hampers the potential for economic 
activity and development in the area.
Refugee and IDP return is also likely to be 
discouraged by the nature of the restructured 
state whereby, for example, the education 
system is divided ethnically, following the 
majority ethnic curriculum for subjects such 
as history, language and religious studies. 
Finally, most of the IDPs, particularly the 
younger ones, have by now re-established 
their lives and livelihoods and have built 
social capital in new areas of residence, 
and no longer have connections with their 
place of origin or a desire to return there.
Political and social consequences
Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically the 
most mixed state in the former Yugoslavia, 
with a high degree of mutual respect, 
tolerance and coexistence. The displacement 
of large numbers of people during the 
conflict, however, caused demographic 
changes in the ethnic composition of 
towns and villages. Although Annex 7 of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement attempted to 
restore the multi-ethnic character of BiH, the 
‘entity’ lines1 followed war-time divisions 
and when the displaced populations did 
not, on the whole, return to their pre-war 
residence, ethnic homogeneity was further 
embedded. The result was the creation of 
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement
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separate, almost mono-ethnic communities 
with little intermingling of the population.  
These entity lines pose not only 
institutional and structural borders but 
also emotional and psychological barriers. 
Heterogeneous, mixed communities were the 
places of the most vicious fighting, and return 
to these areas has been slow and difficult. 
In cases where it has occurred, the high 
levels of mistrust and in some cases ethnic 
intolerance remain, with little potential for 
building strong and integrated communities.
In turn, mistrust, intolerance and lack of 
community-level integration have resulted 
in the failure of reconciliation efforts at both 
the community and national level. Even in 
cases where there have been minority returns, 
these did not necessarily facilitate the process 
of reconciliation; simply sharing living space 
does not imply that the ethnic groups have 
resolved the issues of the past and forgiven 
each other. And as people from different 
ethnic groups continue to live separately from 
each other, the divisions are being fomented 
and used by those promoting nationalist 
politics and potential secession, generating 
renewed political instability in the country.
Although Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement created a legal and policy 
framework for the return of refugees and 
IDPs with the goal of re-building inter-
ethnic trust and respect, the subsequent 
policies and approaches did not succeed in 
ensuring long-term returns and, with that, 
long-term stability and community building. 
Although the majority of the population of 
BiH simply wishes to see progress and better 
opportunities, the approach to refugee and 
IDP return has instead perpetuated political 
and economic instability by entrenching 
ethnic divisions. The absence of inter-ethnic 
community integration which could have 
happened through returns also resulted in 
missed opportunities for reconciliation.
Lana Pašić lana.pasic@gmail.com @Lana_Pasic 
Writer and development consultant from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and regular contributor to and 
editor of Balkanalysis.com. 
1. The Dayton Peace Agreement divided BiH into two ‘entities’: 
the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska.
Sarajevo, 1996.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years on from Dayton
Andrew Mayne
The coming two-and-a-half years represent what is possibly the last window of opportunity  
to accomplish what the Dayton Peace Agreement’s Annex 7 set out to achieve.
The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
on 14 December 1995, and its Annex 7 on 
‘Agreement on Refugees and Displaced 
Persons’ established that: “All refugees and 
displaced persons have the right freely to 
return to their homes of origin […] to have 
restored to them property of which they were 
deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any property 
that cannot be restored to them.”1 In the 
following ten years, over one million of the 
2.2 million people displaced by the conflict in 
BiH returned and/or recovered their pre-war 
property; more than 200,000 properties were 
restored to their pre-war owners through a 
Property Law Implementation Plan; and some 
317,000 housing units were reconstructed.
Progress then slowed, as most of the 
remaining population of concern were 
vulnerable, had no property to reconstruct or 
were reluctant or too frail to return and unable 
to achieve solutions without special help. 
Recognition of this led to the Revised Strategy 
for implementation of Annex 7, adopted by 
both houses of the BiH parliament in June 
2010, in which for the first time national 
political stakeholders agreed that extremely 
vulnerable people who were unable to return 
should be allowed to find a solution in their 
place of displacement. This in turn enabled 
the BiH authorities to start planning projects 
specifically addressing the needs of the 
remaining vulnerable households, including 
rehousing around 8,600 residents from the 
remaining 156 collective centres by providing 
non-profit social housing solutions and 
other specialised types of accommodation.
Now, almost 20 years since Dayton, an 
array of projects is in place; these projects, 
however, only have the capacity to assist a 
maximum of 11,000 families out of the total 
of 40,000 estimated to be either in need or 
considered entitled, and can only address 
the most acute needs. It is estimated that 
84,5002 persons still holding IDP status and 
47,000 ‘minority returnees’ (those displaced 
who now found their ethnicity to be in the 
numerical minority in their areas of origin) 
are still in need of support to obtain a 
sustainable solution. The challenge for BiH 
today is thus to be able to identify and select 
the families who most need the assistance 
that is available, and to make sure that 
assistance does actually go to these people. 
While this sounds simple enough, five main 
recurrent problems typically hinder progress:
  fragmentation in the institutional setup of 
BiH that prolongs decision making and 
hinders coordination
  the absence of updated information on the 
persons remaining in need and the severity 
of the problems they face – information 
that is necessary in order to facilitate 
needs-based prioritisation and to counter 
the widely shared political conviction that 
members of all three constituent peoples 
should receive an equal share of assistance
  the lack of readiness and capacity of local 
authorities to assume responsibility for 
integration of minorities and for the  
social-welfare needs of vulnerable IDPs and 
returnees
  insufficient acceptance of the role that civil 
society needs to play in securing social 
justice for the vulnerable by consistently 
representing their interests to local 
authorities
  the tendency of administrative bodies to 
measure impact in terms of numbers of 
housing units rebuilt, rather than numbers 
of displaced families gaining access to 
rights, livelihoods and services.
In the worst-case scenario, these problems 
could defeat efforts to implement the Annex 
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement
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7 Revised Strategy. Projects could take too 
long to implement, could assist people who 
no longer need help and leave stranded those 
still in need. The projects could risk building 
houses that then stand empty, using up the 
available resources while leaving the problem 
unsolved. Vulnerable displaced people, 
women victims of violence and minority 
returnees could continue to live in destitution 
and may pass on their marginalised status 
and sense of injustice to the next generation. 
Deep-seated accusations would continue to 
be traded between the entities and among 
their constituent peoples, and twenty years 
of progress and investment in reconciliation 
and restitution of justice could be put at risk.
On the other hand, the substantial 
projects and resources that are now in place 
provide a window of opportunity. The 
challenge is to engage municipalities, reach 
the neediest beneficiaries and overcome 
those obstacles that block realisation of 
rights and normalisation of status. 
Stages of response
When the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) was called on, 
through Annex 7, to take the lead in BiH 
on developing a plan for addressing the 
problem of wartime displacement, it turned 
out that not one plan was needed but three 
in succession – though with the authorities 
progressively assuming the lead. 
The first plan resulted in the return of 
more than 500,000 people to their places of 
origin in the first five years (1996 to 2000) after 
the war. When it was widely recognised in 
1999 and 2000, however, that most of these 
were ‘majority returns’ (people who now 
found themselves in the ethnic majority in 
their place of pre-war residence), the second 
plan was drawn up, rallying international 
efforts behind minority returns. Conditions 
of return were often far from conducive 
and in some cases violent resistance by 
local authorities had to be overcome. Some 
470,000 persons returned and/or had their 
property returned or reconstructed in this 
phase, including through the mechanism 
of the Property Law Implementation Plan 
(PLIP) overseen by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR)3, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
UNHCR, the United Nations Mission in  
BiH and the authorities.
In some municipalities, returnees were 
denied access to employment and other basic 
rights by those opposing return. Almost 
14,000 houses, including whole villages, 
were destroyed a considerable time after the 
war had ended, often to discourage the new 
minorities from returning. In some places, 
where minority returnee communities 
were left to fend for themselves, life got 
progressively worse. Many families were 
unable to stay while many more struggled 
to survive on subsistence farming.
High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres visits returnees 
waiting for reconstruction assistance, Srebrenica, August 2009.
U
N
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The third and final plan began with 
the formulation of the Revised Strategy for 
implementation of Annex 7, recognising 
the hard-won acceptance of all stakeholders 
that many of the most vulnerable remaining 
displaced families would be unable to 
return and should therefore be assisted 
to find a solution in their current place of 
displacement. This policy shift led to the 
development of several major projects: 
The Sarajevo Process is a regional 
dialogue initiated by UNHCR in 2005 to 
look for solutions to protracted problems 
of refugees and displacement in Serbia, 
BiH, Croatia and Montenegro – the four 
countries affected by the 1992 to 1995 
conflicts. In BiH this coincided 
with the end of large-scale 
return movements. The 
Process, involving UNHCR, 
the OSCE, the European 
Union and the United States, 
initially made slow headway. 
It was revived in 2008 by 
the intervention of UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
António Guterres who, with 
specially appointed Personal 
Envoy for the Western Balkans 
Anne-Willem Bijleveld, 
succeeded in garnering donor 
support and persuading 
the four countries to sign 
the Belgrade Declaration in 
November 2011. This in turn 
led to a Donor Conference 
and the birth of the Regional 
Housing Programme in April 
2012 (which raised almost 
€300 million for housing) 
to be implemented by the 
four country governments.
The Regional Housing 
Programme (RHP) aims to 
assist 73,600 beneficiaries 
through providing some 
27,000 housing units in the 
four countries combined, 
with BiH planning to assist 
14,000 persons (some 5,400 
families). Challenges for 
the RHP include building the capacity 
of partner countries to manage these 
major projects, including the selection 
of beneficiaries. This entails cooperation 
between the four countries to enable cross-
border verification of overall eligibility, 
vulnerability and intention to return, 
and persuading municipalities to plan 
and deliver complementary measures to 
improve access to roads, electricity, water, 
livelihoods, basic rights and services – none 
of which are funded by the RHP itself.
A priority for BiH is to provide 
permanent accommodation for those in 
‘alternative’ accommodation or in collective 
centres. Alternative accommodation 
is temporary housing provided by 
municipalities to displaced families who 
had been occupying abandoned houses 
but had to return them to their owners 
under the property restitution programme. 
Collective centres were meant to provide 
temporary accommodation for internally 
displaced people driven out of conflict 
zones and were either purpose-built 
or were pre-existing structures such as 
workers’ barracks, abandoned offices, 
apartment blocks or hospital buildings. 
Most of these ‘temporary’ dwellings have 
since deteriorated to the point of being 
uninhabitable, with their residents among 
the most destitute in the country. 
The solution devised for the remaining 
residents of collective centres is a project by 
the name of CEB II (CEB: Council of Europe 
Development Bank), funded by a CEB loan 
plus the state’s own contribution, which 
formally began in November 2014. Forty-
two municipalities submitted schemes to 
rehouse the residents of all of their collective 
centres in non-profit social housing. The 
planned social housing facilities will 
comprise new apartments for the residents 
– but will require payment of rent and 
utilities, which presents a major challenge to 
vulnerable families with little or no income.
Through the EU’s Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA)4, UNHCR 
was requested to receive and manage 
€7 million to support the coordination 
of the Annex 7 Revised Strategy in an 
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Resolving a protracted refugee situation through  
a regional process 
Olga Mitrovic 
Protracted refugee situations are usually a result of political deadlock, and their resolution 
demands the involvement of a range of actors and a multifaceted approach focused on 
leveraging political will. Despite its shortcomings, the Regional Process in the Western 
Balkans offers a number of lessons for resolving such situations.
In 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia signed the 
Joint Declaration on Ending Displacement 
and Ensuring Durable Solutions for 
Vulnerable Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons.1 A year later a donor 
fund was established to implement a multi-
year Regional Housing Programme (RHP) 
to provide durable solutions to the 74,000 
most vulnerable displaced persons.  
This was the end result of a Regional 
Process to find durable solutions that was 
developed with strong support from the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 
initial ten priority municipalities through 
capacity building to local authorities as 
well as individual assistance. UNHCR 
co-financed this action with an additional 
€1.1 million. Related projects run by 
UNHCR and the UN Country Team 
cover a further ten municipalities. 
Lastly, under a Joint Declaration 
signed in June 2013, BiH’s Ministry for 
Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR), the 
entity ministries, the EU Delegation, the 
UN Resident Coordinator and UNHCR 
committed to a strategy of support for Annex 
7 implementation through a three- to five-
year process of social inclusion targeting 
a range of socially vulnerable groups. 
Conclusion
The coming two-and-a-half years to the 
end of 2017 represent what is possibly 
the last window of opportunity to get 
solutions on track and move effectively 
through the completion phase. The five 
recurrent problems highlighted earlier 
continue to put this desired outcome at risk. 
What is needed now more than ever is:
  strong leadership by the new government
  strengthening of existing national-
international partnerships (by a 
coordination mechanism and problem-
solving body currently in formation5)
  joint action plans, balancing quality and 
speed of implementation, centred on 
greater assumption of responsibility by 
local authorities and civil society, and 
focusing on systematically identifying and 
addressing the most acute of the remaining 
needs
  continuity of funding to allow the needs-
driven approach to be extended to more 
municipalities and mainstreamed into 
programmes for social inclusion and 
development.
Andrew Mayne mayne@unhcr.org  
UNHCR Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Regional Representative for 
South-Eastern Europe. www.unhcr.org
1. Text online at www.refworld.org/docid/3de497992.html.
2. Source: BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, 31 
December 2013; subsequently adjusted by MHRR to 100,300, 
confirmation pending. 
3. The High Representative for BiH and the Office of the 
High Representative created in 1995 to oversee the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
4. The means by which the EU supports reforms in countries 
wanting to join the EU with financial and technical help. http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm 
5. By the new Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, Minister 
Semiha Borovac.
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European Union (EU) and the United States. 
Despite the slow and imperfect progress 
of the Regional Process, and despite the 
specifics of the EU that cannot be replicated 
elsewhere, the fact that countries have 
addressed a political deadlock that existed 
for sixteen years can provide valuable 
insights for future policy responses to 
protracted refugee situations in general. 
Return policies in post-war BiH and Croatia
In BiH, refugee return was incorporated 
into the peace agreement. The resolute 
commitment of the international community 
to enforce Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, with the idea of reversing the 
effects of ethnic cleansing, facilitated the 
return of more than one million people, of 
whom almost half were ‘minority returns’ 
(returnees who would ethnically now 
be in a minority in their place of origin/
return). Implementation of the Property 
Law Implementation Plan led to property 
restitution in BiH on the unprecedented scale 
of 99% (although it is significant that this did 
not in fact result in sustained mass return).
Conversely, in Croatia, where there 
was significantly less pressure from the 
international community, the government 
hindered minority return in a variety of 
ways, blocking the possibility of unlocking 
the protracted refugee situation for 
years. Impediments to return included 
discrimination, ethnically motivated 
violence and inadequate access to housing 
and employment. The largest issue affecting 
return was the government’s decision to 
deprive in absentia 40,000 former residents 
of state-owned apartments (referred to 
as ‘OTR’ – occupancy and tenancy right 
– holders) of their property rights. 
In 1996, Serbia hosted the largest refugee 
population in Europe: 617,700 people from 
BiH and Croatia. By 2008, despite mass local 
integration and granting of citizenship, 
Serbia still hosted 97,000 refugees. For 
years bilateral relations between Serbia 
and Croatia were plagued with refugee-
related problems whereas BiH developed 
positive bilateral cooperation with both 
Croatia and Serbia. Yet there was a constant 
awareness that the problem could only 
be resolved fully at a regional level. 
Regional process 
An important breakthrough came with the 
2005 Sarajevo Declaration when Croatia, BiH, 
Serbia and Montenegro agreed to cooperate 
in identifying and removing obstacles to 
durable solutions by developing national 
road maps that would later be merged 
into a joint programme, with the OSCE, 
UNHCR and the EU assisting them in this 
endeavour. Though some moderate progress 
was achieved, the process soon reached a 
standstill due to Croatia’s refusal to further 
discuss issues of social security, pensions 
and OTR. The Sarajevo Declaration lacked 
the necessary political backing, and the 
international stakeholders at the time had 
no consolidated approach or clear vision 
as to how to overcome this impasse.
The opportunity to reinvigorate efforts 
came in December 2008 at the Second High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ Dialogue on 
Protection Challenges when Serbia was 
listed under the High Commissioner’s 
Special Initiative on Protracted Situations 
as one of the five countries in the world 
with a protracted refugee situation that 
demanded urgent attention. The Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme promoted a two-pronged 
approach: provide incentives for the countries 
in question to ensure their commitment to 
finding comprehensive solutions, and bring 
on board members of the international 
community with strong leverage capacity. 
Delegations from Serbia and Croatia 
confirmed their commitment to resolve the 
refugee problem and the Serbian government 
moved to re-launch the Sarajevo Process. 
International efforts resulted in the 
2010 Belgrade Conference at which the 
four countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
adopted a communiqué reaffirming their 
commitment to resolving the region’s 
protracted displacement situation; in this they 
highlighted the priority for assistance to be 
given to vulnerable persons, primarily those 
in collective centres, and stated that opting 
for return or for local integration would 
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remain the individual choice of each refugee. 
UNHCR, the EU and the OSCE issued a Joint 
Statement, extending their full support to the 
Regional Process, while frequent meetings 
between Croatia’s newly elected President 
Josipović  and his Serbian counterpart Tadić 
allowed the refugee problem to become 
prominent on the political agenda. These 
presidents, both considered moderate pro-
European leaders, expressed their readiness 
to tackle sensitive issues – such as border 
demarcation, missing persons and mutual 
lawsuits for genocide – which had created 
an impasse with their predecessors.
The 2010 Belgrade Conference marked 
the start of a two-year period of intensive 
negotiations and work. Small working 
groups were established for each area of 
concern, their size and frequent meetings 
being considered the best mechanism for 
building trust among participants. The joint 
approach of the international community 
was an invaluable feature of the Regional 
Process. UNHCR and the OSCE provided 
continuous assistance and technical 
expertise to the groups while the EU instilled 
commitment to regional cooperation. The 
HC’s appointment of a Personal Envoy to lead 
the process, and the transparency introduced 
in negotiations and video conferences, 
ensured that the international community 
spoke ‘with one voice’ to the countries. 
Finally, an agreement on the Regional 
Housing Programme was followed by a 
Ministerial Declaration and later a donor 
conference where €261 million were 
pledged to finance the first phase.
Preconditions for success
What was possible in Belgrade in 2010 
that was not possible in Sarajevo in 
2005? The answer lies in three factors: 
  a pragmatic approach by all stakeholders 
to addressing the needs of the most 
vulnerable and not repeating the failure 
from 2005 
  the political will of Serbia and Croatia 
  the strong leverage of the EU. 
In other words, the approach to refugee issues 
was transformed because, within the EU 
enlargement context, the political leadership 
of Serbia and Croatia could not afford to 
waste this chance. The EU and UNHCR 
repeatedly conveyed that this was the last 
push to collectively address the remaining 
concerns, and the High Commissioner’s 
Special Initiative in 2008 brought the 
international spotlight back on the Balkans. 
In 2010, Croatia still did not want to offer 
compensation to OTR holders but because 
of its EU accession hopes it had to improve 
its housing provision programmes and 
commit to the Regional Process. Serbia 
accepted the needs-based approach that 
was offered, while still insisting that 
the question of refugees’ tenancy rights 
should continue to be pursued. When the 
compromise on OTR was reached, other 
problems could be addressed: pensions, 
validation of documents, and restoration 
of destroyed and damaged property. 
The final key factor was the EU accession 
policy. Once displacement was incorporated 
into the wider EU enlargement package 
and the Regional Process came to be 
evaluated as part of the countries’ overall 
accession progress, the EU became a game-
changer and no country could afford to 
jeopardise the regional cooperation:
Bosnian refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995.
U
N
H
CR
/H
 K
ra
lj
Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 15
FM
R
 5
0
www.fmreview.org/dayton20September 2015
“We recognise that the successful resolution of 
these issues is vital to the further enhancement 
of positive and productive relations among our 
countries and citizens and underpinning of our 
respective bids to join the EU.” 2011 Joint 
Declaration [emphasis added]
Conclusion
Progress on numerous issues has slowed 
down since the donor conference. The delay 
in implementing the RHP – with construction 
works only starting in July 2014, two years 
after the donor conference – has met with 
much criticism. Once Croatia joined the EU, 
state funding for reconstruction and housing 
programmes was cut drastically, and there is 
a stalemate also in the areas of pensions and 
return of agricultural property. Furthermore, 
declaring that the circumstances that led to 
displacement in Croatia no longer exist, in 
2014 UNHCR recommended the cessation of 
refugee status for 49,506 refugees; although 
the decision on the cessation of status remains 
with host countries, the recommendation 
potentially jeopardises momentum.
Despite all its shortcomings, however, the 
achievements of the Regional Process cannot 
be ignored. The Regional Process proved  
to be an effective mechanism for pursuing 
durable solutions in many respects. It was 
the first time that the Special Initiative was 
launched to prioritise resolving a particular 
PRS. It was the first partnership of UNHCR 
and the EU in this field. And it was the first, 
and probably the only time, that resolution of 
a protracted refugee stituation coincided with 
the eve of accession to the EU of one of its 
parties. This conjunction of favourable factors 
may be impossible to replicate elsewhere 
but many instruments of the Regional 
Process can be replicated in other settings. 
The first lesson is for UNHCR to act as a 
catalyst for mobilising international support 
and getting the right actors on board. In the 
former Yugoslavia the OSCE was the obvious 
choice due to their mandate and expertise. In 
a crisis where self-reliance of refugees is the 
primary challenge, UNDP or IOM would be 
more suitable partners. However, more than 
choosing agencies with appropriate mandates, 
a strong push from a political actor is needed. 
While the EU’s elaborate conditionality 
mechanism cannot be replicated, other 
regional actors – such as the African Union, 
ECOWAS or ASEAN – could find economic 
or political incentives to offer to countries 
affected by protracted refugee crises. 
The second lesson is for return to 
be addressed early on and embedded 
in the rule of law and recognition of 
rights; if this does not happen, injustice 
and grievances will remain. 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the 
Regional Process, the fact remains that BiH, 
Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia have secured 
joint, comprehensive durable solutions to 
the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the 
Second World War. To that end, the Regional 
Process should be recognised for the real 
tangible solutions it has brought about.
Olga Mitrovic mitrovic.o@gmail.com 
Expert for Migration and Development,  
IOM Belgrade. www.iom.int
This article is drawn from the author’s Master’s 
thesis completed at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2013-14. The 
opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the author and not necessarily those of IOM.
1. www.osce.org/pc/85049 
Bosnian refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995.
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Voices in displacement 
Claudia Meyerhoefer
“These people are as if lost in time and space.” Still displaced after 20 years, residents of 
collective centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina share their frustration. They need to be listened to. 
The Bosnian war ended in 1995 but many 
of those displaced during the war still live 
in a situation of protracted displacement, 
neither adequately protected by the state 
nor fully able to access the basic rights 
of their citizenship. As of 2014, around 
8,500 internally displaced people still 
live in about 100 collective centres in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).1 
“If you would have asked me 15 years ago, I would 
not have believed that we would end up … still 
having such problems.” 
I visited Mihatovici Collective Centre 
which is the largest in the country, with 
several hundred residents, located about 
10km from the city of Tuzla and built in 
1993 with Norwegian aid. Mainly displaced 
women and children from Srebrenica and 
eastern BiH reside there, by now including 
second- and third-generation IDPs. The 
second centre I visited, Hrasnica, was 
established in 1998 and is located outside 
Sarajevo in a former hotel. Since many 
families resettled, there are only 32 people 
still living there. Conversations with 
centre residents reflect how poverty and 
work are the main concerns of daily life. 
“I don’t have anything. Do you know what that 
means? Absolutely nothing.” 
“We don’t have any salaries, we don’t have any 
financial help. […] I am just managing as well as 
I can. I have some cattle. I do whatever work I can, 
that’s how I earn some money.” 
The IDPs in BiH have been dependent 
on aid for up to twenty years. Humanitarian 
aid provided essential support for IDPs who 
found themselves poverty-stricken after 
they fled their homes. However, donors and 
organisations have since shifted their focus, 
and programmes were terminated after the 
end of the emergency phase. Nonetheless, 
many IDPs are still dependent on assistance 
today. 
As many IDPs are elderly, some of them 
receive pensions. However, pensions usually 
do not suffice for even basic needs. This is 
an issue particularly for women, due to their 
longer life expectancy and lower number 
of years worked in formal employment.
The housing conditions are appalling. 
The buildings are old and fragile; some 
residents do not have heating or water; the 
space is inadequate for families; and other 
facilities such as telephones are often lacking. 
“These houses that we live in, you have to come and 
see them. They are completely destroyed….” 
Education is another major concern. 
Mihatovici has an elementary school, funded 
by NGOs and providing school materials, 
meals and afternoon projects for the children. 
A senior staff member made it clear to 
me that, in his view, educating children 
sufficiently so that they could “get out of 
here” was the only effective way to assist 
them. However, in order to go on to middle 
and high school, the children have to attend 
schools in nearby towns, and many parents 
are unable to pay for public transport.
In addition to the physical health 
problems many displaced people face 
(due to malnutrition, violence during 
the war, etc), many also suffer from 
mental health problems. Clearly, the 
violence experienced during the war and 
their displacement often have serious 
repercussions, such as depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, drug abuse and 
violent behaviour. I encountered alcoholism, 
depression, neurosis and the regular 
taking of sedatives. Furthermore, residents 
told of frequent conflicts in the centre: 
“They fight a lot. They hit each other like in the 
Wild West.” 
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Yet IDPs face difficulties in accessing 
health services, partly because of lack 
of financial means and partly because 
of poor and patchy provision by the 
fragmented state apparatus. 
Particular challenges for women
Displaced women experience additional, 
gender-specific obstacles in rebuilding 
their lives after displacement. 
“As a displaced women, you’re not just displaced, 
you carry [an] additional [burden].” 
Women took responsibility for the 
survival of and provision for their families 
under the worst conditions during the war. 
Displaced after the war, they faced poverty 
and powerlessness, often left wondering 
about the fate of husbands or children. 
Many women are now the sole head of a 
household. During the war, women were 
pushed into new positions of influence and 
leadership, as well as income provision and 
decision making in the household. Several 
respondents confirmed these changes in 
gender roles and indicated that when the war 
ended, men took over leading positions in 
communities and politics again, and women 
were pushed back into the domestic space. 
In a country where jobs are scarce in 
general, it is very difficult for displaced 
women to compete for jobs, in part due to 
the priority placed on the recruitment of 
demobilised soldiers or family members of 
deceased soldiers and injured veterans. I 
found that although a few women residents  
of collective centres find agricultural work, 
most have no such opportunities. Lack of 
access to land is a common problem. Also, 
many women displaced from rural parts of 
BiH are not sufficiently educated to compete 
in other sectors.
“There should be crafts, workshops, things like 
that for women. Something should be organised so 
that we can contribute and produce things and sell 
them. We need jobs. We need ways to earn money.” 
Income-generating programmes (not 
only in BiH but globally) tend to put an 
emphasis on activities such as handicrafts 
and sewing, because they are traditionally 
viewed as female activities. This might mean 
independence for some women; however, 
these are often marginal economic activities. 
A better approach would be a more holistic 
one, which would support displaced women 
with skills training to access new markets 
and with opportunities such as micro-credit 
loans but which would also address their 
needs in other areas, such as psychosocial 
support. Catholic Relief Services, for example, 
provides individual help depending on 
Collective centre in Hrasnica, 1995.
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the needs of a family, such as livelihood 
opportunities, kitchen gardens, scholarships, 
agricultural machinery, housing and 
psychological support. Meanwhile, a positive 
example of providing an opportunity for 
self-employment is BH Crafts.2 However, 
more skills training projects are needed.
Participation and consultation
Many IDPs feel hopeless in the face of a 
government that gives the impression 
that it has turned its back on them. The 
lack of tangible success in assisting 
IDPs to find a solution over the past two 
decades has left them disillusioned and 
resentful, feeling ignored and forgotten:
“These people are as if lost in time and space.”
“Social workers never come here.” 
“Whenever someone comes, they visit the manager. 
We don’t know who came, for what reason; we are 
never informed about anything, and we are not 
really asked.”
“This is the first meeting that we have been  
invited to.” 
Yet giving displaced people a chance to 
be heard and to participate in decisions 
affecting them is crucial for building 
effective support programmes and finding a 
sustainable solution for them. In addition, it 
would do more than just give them a voice. 
It would strengthen their sense of personal 
worth, and their sense of community 
and of belonging in their own country.
Claudia Meyerhoefer  
claudia.meyerhoefer@gmail.com  
Social worker in refugee shelters in Germany.
1. In 2014, while studying for an MA in Intercultural Conflict 
Management I undertook qualitative research into the current 
challenges facing IDPs in BiH (in cooperation with CESI, the 
Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies in Sarajevo) and conducted 20 
in-depth interviews with IDPs and local and international actors. 
All quotes in this article come from these interviews.
2. BH Crafts provides women with tools and material for knitting 
clothes, which the company then sells. The programme is now 
open to all women seeking additional income but was started as a 
project for residents of the Mihatovici Collective Centre and many 
of the beneficiaries are displaced women.
Property rights and reconstruction in the Bosnian 
return process 
Inmaculada Serrano
Sidelining a rights-based approach in the area of property restitution and reconstruction  
in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in an unequal impact on rural versus urban  
displaced populations. 
Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
represented a breakthrough in the history of 
conflict settlement. It stated for the first time 
that displaced persons should be able not just 
to repatriate to their country of origin but 
to return to their actual pre-war homes. The 
rationale for this was the perceived moral 
imperative to reverse the ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
that had occurred during the war (and that 
the international community had been unable 
to stop), and the success of Annex 7 was 
clearly viewed as directly related to ‘minority 
returns’ – that is, the return of those among 
the displaced who now found their ethnicity 
to be in the numerical minority in their areas 
of origin. Nonetheless, this aim presented 
a clear tension with the human rights 
language in which it was anchored, which 
emphasised the individual’s right to choose 
their destination (i.e. whether to return or 
not), and their right to property restitution or 
compensation (Article I.1 and 4 of Annex 7). 
Many properties had been destroyed 
during the war. Access to many other 
properties, mostly in urban areas, was 
impeded because they had been occupied 
by other displaced persons of a different 
ethnicity, and restitution was fiercely 
opposed by all sides. In response, in 1999 
the international community conceived 
and implemented the Property Law 
Implementation Plan (PLIP1), overseen by the 
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Commission for Real Property 
Claims of Displaced Persons and 
Refugees (CRPC). With restitution 
of the 200,000 occupied housing 
units increasing from 21% in the 
first year to 92% in the fourth,2 
PLIP constitutes one of the biggest 
successes of the implementation of 
Annex 7 and restitution of rights. 
However, it is frequently 
overlooked that reconstruction 
was an even more critical issue 
than property restitution. 
UNHCR estimated the number of 
housing units that were partially 
or completely destroyed to be 
459,000 (more than double the 
number of repossession claims 
filed by CRPC). 60% of the housing stock was 
partially destroyed and 18% was completely 
destroyed, not only during the fighting but 
also after the signing of Dayton by those 
trying to prevent people from returning.
By 2008 only approximately half of these 
units (some 260,000 houses) had been rebuilt, 
mainly because of a lack of funding.3 The 
stark contrast between the robust and decisive 
role of the international community in the 
implementation of property rights and its 
much more deficient role in the reconstruction 
process had to do mostly with the costs of 
the latter. It is significant that while PLIP 
was obviously anchored in the language of 
rights, reconstruction assistance was largely 
specified as humanitarian assistance. 
Rural versus urban
PLIP is considered a success not only 
in terms of rights restitution but also 
because it facilitated a breakthrough 
in the minority returns process by the 
year 2000 when properties were finally 
made available to their owners. It is less 
frequently emphasised, however, that this 
involved evicting the people occupying 
these properties, a large proportion of 
whom were people of rural origin for whom 
the main housing problem upon return 
was reconstruction, not repossession. 
The tension between the rights-based 
approach implied in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and the moral (and political) 
imperative of reversing ethnic cleansing 
becomes clearer when considering the 
position in which (mostly) rural returnees 
were put. In many cases, following 
implementation of PLIP, families were evicted 
before their houses were reconstructed, 
because of the shortage of reconstruction 
funds. Whereas in the initial years after 
the end of the war there were plenty of 
funds available, donor fatigue and a serious 
reconstruction funding gap were evident 
by 1999, and in 2002 the funding gap 
between demand for reconstruction and 
available funds amounted to €600 million. 
People holding IDP status and under 
a certain income threshold were entitled 
to temporary alternative accommodation. 
But with time, they risked losing their 
IDP status (and access to alternative 
accommodation) if they did not commit 
themselves to reconstruction. And once 
reconstruction assistance was granted, 
the right to alternative accommodation 
was lost. In short, PLIP effectively pushed 
people, mostly of rural origin, to return.
This is not to say that there were not 
genuine cases of voluntary return among 
rural returnees; on the contrary, many of 
these returns had been greatly longed for. 
Some of the local people I interviewed, 
however, characterised the process of 
return in three main stages. First came 
Refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995.
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the ‘pioneers’ – or “the crazy ones” – who 
returned spontaneously, without any external 
support or backup. Then there was a wave 
of returns once reconstruction assistance 
started being available. Those returning after 
that point were, in their own words, mostly 
“people who were left with no other choice”.4
Wealthier households who did not (as 
yet) wish to return were able to rent or buy 
property where they lived now. But this was 
not the case for poorer families for whom 
the only available assistance, besides the 
support they received as registered IDPs, was 
reconstruction assistance. Since a condition 
for receiving reconstruction assistance was 
being present in the area of return, many 
did opt to return even if they had to live 
in tents, partially reconstructed houses or 
improvised shacks. This situation lasted 
for months and even years in some cases. 
Sidelining the right to choose
There is no doubt that the international 
community faced a fundamental dilemma 
regarding minority returns in BiH but, 
in pursuit of the goal of reversing ethnic 
cleansing, people’s right to choose was, 
to a large extent, sidelined. This requires 
a profound re-thinking within the 
international community, particularly 
so considering the relatively poor results 
achieved in terms of reversing ethnic 
cleansing. A policy which took into 
account individual motivations and 
constraints, and adjusted its time-frame 
accordingly, might have been more effective 
in enabling return, as well as more in 
line with the recognition of people’s 
right to choose enshrined in Annex 7. 
Minority returns have in fact taken 
place largely to rural areas, with towns 
registering much lower numbers. But the 
reasons for this asymmetry also have to 
do with security considerations, given the 
larger ethnic segregation in the countryside, 
as well as with economic factors, since 
agriculture and cattle-breeding provide a 
means of subsistence in an environment of 
widespread discrimination and a depressed 
economy. In addition, repossessed houses 
in urban areas were in demand by members 
of the majority ethnic group that had been 
displaced mostly to towns and cities. This 
made it possible for urban dwellers to sell 
these properties or to exchange them. This 
option was not available in rural areas where 
the only benefit that displaced people could 
derive from their reconstructed properties 
was actually making use of them. 
The international community went 
to great lengths to provide the necessary 
security conditions, as well as the 
harmonisation of health-care systems and 
pension funds and the reconstruction 
of infrastructure to provide the basic 
conditions for return. But the main issue 
was – and remains – the lack of employment 
opportunities and widespread discrimination 
in accessing the very limited opportunities 
that do exist. In this regard the international 
community also failed to meet the promise 
made in Article I of Annex 7 about the 
right to restitution of, or compensation for, 
any property of which individuals were 
deprived during the conflict. In practice, 
properties other than houses – such as 
business premises and usurped land – 
did not receive similar attention in the 
repossession or compensation process. All 
of this undoubtedly inhibited people from 
returning, and contributed to the fragile 
nature of the minority return process overall.
Inmaculada Serrano serrano.inma@gmail.com 
Associate Researcher, Institute Carlos III-Juan 
March, Carlos III University. 
www.march.es/ceacs  
1. http://tinyurl.com/OSCE-PLIP 
2. Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons 
and Refugees (CRPC) End of Mandate Report (1996-2003) (includes 
recommendations for future post-conflict property commissions) 
http://tinyurl.com/CRPC-end-of-mandate-2003
3. See Mooney E (2008) ‘Securing Durable Solutions for Displaced 
Persons in Georgia: The Experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
http://tinyurl.com/Mooney-BiH-2008; International Crisis Group 
(2000) ‘Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International 
Community Ready?’ Europe Report N°95 www.tinyurl.com/ICG-
Bosnia-May2000; Global IDP Project (2003) Protecting internally 
displaced people in the OSCE area. A neglected commitment  
http://tinyurl.com/NRC-IDPs-OSCE-2003 
4. Serrano I (2011) Return after violence: rationality and emotions in 
the aftermath of violent conflict. Instituto Juan March de Estudios 
e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias 
Sociales, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. 
http://tinyurl.com/SerranoI-thesis 
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Resolving protracted displacement through  
social housing 
Marc D’Silva and Sanela Imamovic
A social housing methodology recently introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates the 
need for certain key components in any strategy to address the shelter and livelihoods needs 
of vulnerable citizens.
By 2011 – 16 years after the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement – the return process 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was 
considered successful by many standards. 
Of the 2.2 million citizens displaced during 
the war, over 91% had returned to their 
communities of origin or integrated into 
new communities. Over 320,000 housing 
units had been reconstructed and repaired. 
And yet there were still 193,000 displaced 
persons and refugees in need of durable 
housing solutions. In particular, 8,734 
displaced persons were still living in poor, 
unhealthy conditions in the country’s 160 
collective centres, which for the most part 
were never designed for residential use.1  
These 193,000 people were unable 
or chose not to take advantage of earlier 
housing reconstruction programmes 
for a variety of reasons, including: 
  lack of certification of land mine clearance 
at or near their property
  lack of utilities and basic community 
infrastructure
  insufficient employment opportunities
  ineligibility of tenants who had never 
owned property
  inability to prove legal title to property
  unwillingness to return to a place of 
trauma.
Given this, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
decided in 2007 to refocus its strategy away 
from individual house reconstruction and 
towards the introduction of a new social 
housing methodology. This would help 
to build the capacity of local government 
authorities to provide durable housing 
solutions for collective centre residents and 
other vulnerable displaced groups including 
Roma, readmitted asylum seekers,2 persons 
with disabilities, and the elderly.3 
Social housing principles 
Through social housing, a community can 
help provide affordable housing for those 
of its citizens who are unable to meet their 
housing needs independently. It can take 
the form of new multi-unit, multi-storey 
structures or of individual units constructed 
on top of or rehabilitated within existing 
housing stock. Whatever the type of social 
housing, three principles are essential. Firstly, 
ownership needs to be clearly defined and 
registered with local government. Secondly, 
management and maintenance responsibilities 
must be clearly articulated and organised. 
And, thirdly, eligibility criteria and apartment 
allocation procedures need to be clearly 
defined and communicated from the outset.
CRS’ social housing strategy 
includes the following components:
Formal working group: This needs to be 
established from the outset to facilitate 
collaborative partnerships with local 
government officials, while also building 
municipal capacity to assume management 
and maintenance responsibilities after tenants 
move in.
‘Book of Rules’: This articulates the key 
principles of social housing and defines the 
roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder. 
Official registration of this document in the 
local courts guarantees that future politicians 
will be unable to misuse or sell the units for at 
least 25 years. 
Affordable rents: Rents need to be below 
market rates. Although this can be a challenge 
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for some chronically displaced persons used to 
receiving free housing, it can promote dignity 
and reduce dependency, and generates the 
resources needed to manage and maintain the 
buildings.
Family ‘socio-economic card’: This card 
documents the eligibility criteria of each family 
and then serves as a baseline against which 
future improvements in household income 
and standard of living can be compared. Those 
families whose incomes subsequently rise 
above the official poverty line will have their 
rents readjusted closer to the market rate.
Sustainable livelihood component: Each 
family receives a form of assistance to help 
cover monthly rent/utility payments and to 
rebuild household assets lost during the war. 
Livelihood options are tailored for each family 
and may include agricultural equipment, 
training/support for selling produce, or 
subsidies to local companies to encourage the 
hiring of minority returnees. 
Social linkages and networks: The 
involvement of local government authorities, 
NGOs and other stakeholders in the 
communities of return is important for 
providing appropriate support to returning 
families. 
Mixed-use developments: Promoting mixed 
use of buildings allows minority returnees, 
Roma, persons with disabilities and other 
marginalised groups to integrate physically, 
economically and socially with members of the 
majority community. In some circumstances, 
special provision can be made to attract 
professional and technical cadres for which 
there is a demand in the community; in 
other situations, part or all of the ground 
floor of a housing development can be made 
available for commercial purposes to provide 
employment and marketing opportunities.
A management system: CRS provides a 
specially designed management information 
computer software programme (and 
training in its use) for the relevant municipal 
departments to enable them to: compile key 
information and data on all social housing 
buildings; track rent payment and arrears; 
organise maintenance schedules; and generate 
reports for municipal, entity and state-level 
purposes.
This social housing in Potočari near Srebrenica was built in the last six years (with funding from the Governments of BiH and the 
Netherlands) and provides 58 apartments. Most tenants are returnees. (Potočari was the location of the Srebrenica massacre and it is 
here that the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide is located.) 
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Alignment with international standards: This 
is in order to help BiH comply with any new 
requirements associated with possible future 
accession to the European Union. 
The BiH government has learned the 
risks of omitting one or more of these key 
components from its own social housing 
projects, and of focusing only on the 
building construction aspect. An assessment 
of the social housing constructed by the 
government between 2009 and 2012 concluded 
that failure to clearly define from the 
outset issues of ownership, management, 
maintenance and tenancies had resulted 
in no-one fulfilling those responsibilities; 
furthermore, the lack of legislation and 
policy framework governing social housing 
was preventing both government and 
tenants from fully realising its benefits. 
Key results to date
By the end of 2014, 762 displaced persons 
and returnees in nine municipalities around 
the country had secured safe, dignified 
living conditions in 273 social housing units 
constructed by CRS. Six years after signing 
tenancy contracts, 93% of families were 
still living in the social housing units.4 Of 
the 7% no longer present, over half of them 
had had a positive reason for leaving, e.g. 
marriage, voluntary emigration or securing 
employment in another town. Only 3% 
of social housing units were vacant. This 
stability is an important factor contributing 
to the social and economic growth of their 
communities. Furthermore, 22% of family 
members living in the social housing units 
were under 18 years of age, demonstrating the 
methodology’s effectiveness in attracting the 
type of young, working-age families needed 
to revitalise war-affected communities.
Promising early results led the BiH 
government in 2010 to include social 
housing as a preferred element in its Revised 
Strategy for the Implementation of Annex 7. 
In the years that followed, the Ministry 
of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) 
incorporated social housing as a key strategy 
in two nationwide programmes through 
which more than 2,900 social housing units 
will be constructed.5 In 2015, the MHRR 
adopted CRS’ Social Housing Manual6 as 
the official guidance for all municipalities 
participating in these two programmes.
After initial efforts to establish legislation 
at the state level stalled as a result of a broader 
political stalemate, CRS decided to engage 
key officials at the municipal, canton and 
entity level, where there is the political will 
to develop and pass social housing strategies 
and legislation. In 2013, CRS succeeded in 
helping two cantons (BPK Goražde and 
Zeničko-dobojski) develop and pass the 
country’s first ever social housing legislation. 
Another five municipalities (Srebrenica, 
Prijedor, Goražde, Mostar and Banja Luka) 
have developed social housing strategies 
that provide a common framework for all 
current and new initiatives. And in 2013, the 
MHRR incorporated social housing into the 
second phase of its initiative to support the 
return and integration of asylum seekers 
in ten targeted municipalities and Brčko 
District, demonstrating that the Government 
of BiH now understands the value of 
social housing in helping municipalities 
to address the shelter and livelihoods 
needs of their most vulnerable citizens.
Marc D’Silva marc.dsilva@crs.org 
Sanela Imamovic sanela.imamovic@crs.org  
Catholic Relief Services in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
www.crs.org/countries/bosnia-herzegovina 
1. Data taken from BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees 
(2011) Joint Regional Programme on Durable Solutions for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, Framework Programme.  
http://tinyurl.com/MHRR-framework-prog-2011 
2. Persons from BiH who had sought asylum in other (mostly 
EU) countries in Europe and have been returned via one of the 
formal agreements signed between the governments. About 70% 
of these readmitted asylum seekers are Roma whose lack of birth 
or registration documents makes it difficult to prove that they 
previously lived in BiH.
3. CRS’ social housing initiative was cited as one of two best 
practices for integration of Roma in the Western Balkans. See 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2014) 
Best Practices for Roma Integration: Regional Report on Housing 
Legalization, Settlement Upgrading and Social Housing for Roma in the 
Western Balkans. www.osce.org/odihr/115737 
4. Monitoring data from CRS/BiH staff, May 2015.
5. See article by Mayne A ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years on 
from Dayton’, pp8-11.
6. www.crsprogramquality.org/publications/2015/8/25/manual-
for-non-profit-social-housing.html   
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement
FM
R
 5
0
September 2015www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Asking the right questions in research on 
psychosocial well-being
Selma Porobic
New research is attempting to address the lack of empirical grounding for much of the 
psychosocial programming in post-war trauma in the Western Balkans. 
Psychosocial work by local and international 
mental-health professionals became a 
standard and widespread dimension of 
the humanitarian response to war trauma 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia 
and Kosovo during the 1990s. Generally, 
international programmes in the region 
promote the belief that all those displaced 
by war are traumatised and that external 
psychosocial interventions are essential. The 
efficacy of these interventions is taken for 
granted and yet empirical research on the 
subject is scarce. 
During the war, shortage of research 
resources left little room for data collection 
or impact studies. In the aftermath of 
hostilities this trend mainly continued. In 
addition, attempts to conduct comprehensive 
research in the field of mental health often 
failed due to local people’s increasing 
distrust, especially of foreign agencies and 
non-governmental organisations. Post-war 
treatment and mental health services in BiH 
therefore rarely focused on war-displaced and 
returnees as specific target groups. Rather, 
the whole civilian population was viewed as 
vulnerable, traumatised and incapacitated 
but without any systematic investigation 
into resilience and general well-being. 
In the same way, studies addressing 
the mental health of people displaced by 
war in the region have mainly focused on 
whole populations, rather than sections of 
populations, and have ignored questions  
of resilience. 
Mental health of war displaced and 
returnees
Questions of mental health are still salient 
in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo. According to 
EU project UP.S.TREA.M1, the number of 
persons with mental health difficulties 
is higher in these countries than the EU 
average, with the causes related to two 
decades of stresses such as war, ethnic 
tension and poverty – and the lack of 
organisation in the mental health sector. 
Recognising this and the lack of 
scientific research into the current state of 
psychosocial well-being among marginalised 
social groups, a multidisciplinary research 
team of 18 scholars in three countries 
(Serbia, Kosovo, BiH) headed by the team 
at the University of Sarajevo2 and funded 
by the University of Fribourg’s Regional 
Research Promotion Programme (RRPP) is 
conducting a study on psychosocial health 
among women displaced by the war. The 
research aims to provide insights into the 
connections between migration and mental 
health in a post-war society also undergoing 
a broad socio-political transition. 
On the whole, work on improving 
mental health in post-war BiH has been 
involving many different stakeholders at 
various levels and working with various 
target groups but it is not yet integrated 
with the state-run mechanisms of service 
provision. Specific groups like women 
raped during war, some of whom were 
displaced, have been targeted but the formal 
system largely ignores forced migrants. 
Added to that are the huge problems in 
funding and in conducting research and 
assessing evidence-based practice. 
Following the ongoing reform of the 
mental health sector, new strategies of work 
aim to involve social services in protecting 
and promoting the mental health of citizens 
in general and of returnees and displaced 
persons in particular (as a marginalised, 
vulnerable group).3 Improving social 
inclusion is one of the key requirements 
for harmonising the social development of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 25
FM
R
 5
0
www.fmreview.org/dayton20September 2015
BiH with EU standards. Social inclusion 
requires partnership at all levels between 
governments, public institutions and civil 
society but this is proving very challenging 
in a country which has a plethora of political 
and administrative decision-making centres 
(14 levels of national decision making 
which are subject to conditions imposed 
by external actors such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the 
EU). However, the new centres for mental 
health (resulting from the reform) have the 
potential to provide more adequate mental 
health services as they aim to work, more 
appropriately, through multidisciplinary 
teams and inter-sector cooperation.4
The broader societal context
Bearing in mind the complexity of BiH’s 
socio-economic situation, the RRPP-funded 
research5 is shifting the emphasis from 
the individual clinical health perspective 
to the more complex social dimension 
of understanding the affected displaced 
persons’ and returnees’ reintegration 
process, in relation both to their war 
experiences and to the country’s prevailing 
socio-economic situation. In this way 
important generational differences, gendered 
patterns and urban/rural discrepancies are 
emerging, and mental health assessments 
are being studied in the broader societal 
context that inevitably has an impact on a 
person’s overall psychosocial well-being. 
Through empirical cross-case analysis 
in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo, the project is 
addressing the following research questions: 
How does the experience of inter-ethnic 
violence, large-scale war displacement and 
protracted transition affect the psychosocial 
health of female forced migrants in each of 
the three environments? What is the state 
of their psychosocial well-being, including 
both distress and resilience factors, in these 
challenging social environments? What is 
the nature of psychosocial support, both 
public and non-governmental, formal and 
informal, provided to this population? 
What should be done to address the 
psychosocial needs identified and to 
fill gaps between existing policies and 
programmes? Which good practices (if 
any) could the competent authorities and 
different national, regional and international 
stakeholders build on to improve the practice 
of and access to psychosocial services?
Conclusion
Sound and effective policies require a strong 
evidential basis. Only with this, and the 
in-depth insights that will emerge from the 
evidence, does it become possible to: identify 
how government policies and programmes 
can best assist targeted populations; 
monitor how effectively resources are being 
used; foster learning and development 
in the area; and support stakeholders 
in their roles and responsibilities. 
In addition, the network building 
that such research involves among 
stakeholders of different professional and 
academic backgrounds across the region 
and internationally helps establish and 
develop an inter-and trans-disciplinary 
platform for the long-term benefit of 
forced migration studies in the region.
Much of our experience from post-war 
BiH underlines how psychosocial service 
provision for displaced and returnee 
populations should always be based on 
extensive evidence-based research. Only 
then will it have a direct bearing on 
the quality of life for women returnees, 
internally displaced persons and refugees. 
Selma Porobic porobics@fpn.unsa.ba  
Director, Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, 
University of Sarajevo. 
www.cesi.fpn.unsa.ba/en/ 
1. ‘UPdate of Socializing and TREAtment in Mental health’ – 
involving Caritas Italiana in Serbia and Association Fenix in BiH.
2. In partnership with Serbian and Kosovo research teams.
3. Social Inclusion Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008-13). 
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently working 
on two strategic documents: the Country Development Strategy 
and Mid-term Review of the Social Inclusion Strategy.
4. The Mental Health Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and the Swiss Cantons of Geneva, Jura, Bern and Fribourg has 
completed its first phase (2010-13) and has now entered its second 
phase. 
5. Entitled ‘Engendering Forced Migration, Socio-political 
Transition and Mental Health in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo’.  
For more information see www.cesi.fpn.unsa.ba 
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Wartime division in peacetime schools
Valery Perry
An ethnically divided educational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to limit 
sustainable return, and to hamper reconciliation and the reconstruction of society.   
The inclusion of Annex 7 in the Dayton 
Accords was seminal in many ways but, 
while the return of property to the original 
rightful owners was enormously successful, 
the return of people to their pre-war homes 
was not such a success. This was particularly 
so in the many cases in which a returnee 
would now be in a demographic minority in 
their pre-war community. There was little 
or no effort by political leaders to create a 
genuinely welcoming environment for the 
return of pre-war inhabitants or to jump-start 
post-war political reconciliation. Minority 
return remained a daunting prospect, 
with returnees having difficulty finding 
work in their pre-war communities, and 
facing significant discrimination in terms 
of social relations and in terms of access to 
public services such as health care, police 
protection, social welfare – and schools. 
The education system in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) is a logical consequence 
of both the lack of meaningful and 
systemic political reconciliation over 
the past two decades, and the practical 
public policy implications of the power-
sharing state structure agreed at Dayton. 
The country’s education infrastructure 
was not immune from the new devolved, 
fragmented and, some would say, convoluted 
structure. Schools continued providing 
instruction with the same ethnically 
exclusive character as during the war.1 
In the absence of any state-level 
Ministry of Education to coordinate or drive 
educational policy, the entity- and canton-
level Ministries of Education worked along 
separate and unequal paths. As a result, 
virtually every school in BiH continues 
to have its own dominant ethnic ‘flavour’ 
representing the majority population in 
that community. This is manifest in the 
different curricula and textbooks for Bosniak, 
Croat and Serb schools, different holiday 
celebrations and, in effect, the active and 
ongoing cultivation of different and often 
mutually incompatible worldviews.2 
Different methods, same results
Where there are sufficiently mixed 
communities of Bosniaks and Croats in the 
Federation to make the simple imposition 
of one curriculum impossible, this has led 
to over 50 cases of ‘two schools under one 
roof’. In these cases school buildings are 
‘shared’, with different groups of students 
taught either the Bosniak or Croat curriculum 
in different wings, floors or shifts. In the 
handful of communities in the Republika 
Srpska (RS) that have seen sufficient return 
of non-Serbs, non-Serb students (primarily 
Bosniaks) study the RS curriculum unless 
there is a sufficient number of minority 
students to allow them to follow ‘their’ 
national group of subjects (NGS), including 
history, geography, mother tongue and 
religion, at which point they separate from 
their Serb peers for these subjects. Whether 
in homogenous or mixed areas, children are 
confronted with and taught mono-perspective 
narratives, and whether the divisions are 
visible (as with the ‘2-in-1’ schools) or more 
subtle, the result is the same – a generation of 
young citizens with a meagre sense of their 
shared future in, or vision for, their country.
There was a period of time, particularly 
between 1999 and 2007, when educational 
reforms began to take shape. The needs 
of returnee children were explicitly 
recognised in the Interim Agreement on 
Accommodation of the Rights and Needs of 
Returnee Children, signed in 2002, which 
aimed to end the most blatant practices that 
prevented sustainable return. An effort to 
remove explicit hate speech from history 
textbooks began, and the most ethnically 
exclusive school names and symbols were 
removed. The 2-in-1 schools (themselves 
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an ‘interim’ solution) were in some cases 
improved through a number of attempts at 
administrative unification. The state-level 
Ministry of Civil Affairs developed a small 
education portfolio; a state-level Education 
Agency was developed including an advisory 
capacity to ensure consistent curriculum 
standards and learning outcomes; and a 
Conference of Ministers of Education was 
established to advise, consult and coordinate. 
However, in the absence of either a legal 
commitment to increasingly harmonise 
and integrate educational systems, or the 
political will to press for such an inclusive 
agenda, these bodies have been greatly 
limited in their work, and such reforms failed 
to touch the core problem of the divided 
curricula and the broader continued policy 
of ethnification of public life in BiH.3 
In such a system, minority returnees 
have remained minorities, forced to choose 
to assimilate, to study separately (if there are 
sufficient numbers of returnees) or, perhaps, 
to move, giving up on the idea of return. In 
the past few years, reforms have stopped 
and there are even signs of regression. 
For example, in the RS, in 2013, parents in 
the village of Konjević Polje (not far from 
Srebrenica) pulled their children out of school 
and organised demonstrations in Sarajevo 
(including an ad hoc tent city where some 
of the protestors slept) in protest against RS 
policies and practices that required their 
children to study the RS curriculum. 
The Bosniak parents were not, however, 
demanding a more inclusive school approach 
for both Bosniak and Serb students but their 
own Bosniak curricular subjects – thereby 
also buying into the dominant separation 
narrative. This case exemplifies the dynamics 
of exclusionism and extremism that have 
come to dominate policy debates. The RS 
authorities did not take steps to accommodate 
these demands, and have instead reinforced 
division and ethno-national tensions by 
insisting that those few schools that do offer 
the NGS option (around 20 schools) refer to the 
“language of the Bosniak people” rather than 
the “Bosnian language”, further reinforcing 
the problems of a country that consists of 
‘constituent peoples’ rather than citizens.4 
Conclusion
In the absence of international pressure or 
grassroots demands to revisit the country’s 
divisive educational system and policies, 
there is no reason to believe that the country’s 
schools will improve or become more 
broadly inclusive; the status quo suits the 
ruling nationalist political parties who are 
resistant to more civic options that could 
weaken their own hold on power. In the 
long term this will both threaten the return 
that has occurred to date and effectively 
close the door to any future returns. 
Inclusion of the right to return in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement was a noble ideal 
that in many ways fell victim to the Realpolitik 
of the post-war Dayton state. Those persons 
displaced by the war who have remade 
their lives elsewhere have little incentive 
to return to a country that remains in a 
state of frozen conflict, exemplified by its 
divided education system. Twenty years 
after Dayton, this state of affairs should be 
of concern not only to people interested in 
the Balkans but also to those working to 
stabilise diverse post-war states in other parts 
of the world. Far from being a ‘soft’ policy 
matter, education in a post-war state is a 
security issue that it is perilous to ignore.
Valery Perry valeryperry@yahoo.com 
Independent researcher and consultant based  
in Sarajevo; Senior Associate, Democratization 
Policy Council; lecturer in conflict analysis and 
resolution, Sarajevo School of Science and 
Technology. www.democratizationpolicy.org 
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Herzegovina’ in Listhaug O and Ramet S P (Eds) (2013) Bosnia-
Herzegovina Since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values. Longo Editore 
Ravenna. pp225-246. http://tinyurl.com/PerryV-2013-Listhaug-Ramet
4. Jukić E ‘Hundreds of Bosnian Pupils Fail to Start School’, Balkan 
Insight. 1 September 2014.  
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hundreds-of-pupils-in-bosnia-
did-not-start-school
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Their last name is ‘refugee’: return and local activism
Peter Lippman
Sustainable refugee return can only take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina when ordinary 
people and human rights activists are included as full participants in the recovery process.
As a result of the 1992-95 war, over two 
million people – fully half the population 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – were 
displaced. Of that number, well over a million 
people fled to dozens of countries around 
the world. The rest – internally displaced 
persons – ended up in collective centres, 
in abandoned houses belonging to other 
displaced persons, or staying with relatives in 
the entities controlled by their ethnicity: Serbs 
to the Republika Srpska (RS), and Croats and 
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) to the Federation. 
Although the Croats and Bosniaks 
were formally allied at the end of the war, 
the Federation was ethnically divided as 
well. Territory that ended up under the 
control of Bosnian Croat forces amounted to 
about 20% of BiH, with another 30% under 
Bosniak control. Bosnian Serbs controlled 
the other half of the country. The ethnic 
homogenisation of these territories was 
nearly complete and, for the first time, Croats, 
Bosniaks and Serbs were each designated 
as ‘minorities’ in those areas where their 
own ethnicity did not hold power. 
“Poor people, poor people. All split up, all spread 
out everywhere.” (Raba, aged 70, Sarajevo)
Assessing the wreckage at ground level
The displaced persons I encountered in BiH 
after the war1 were living in collective centres 
(schools, barracks and hotels, temporarily 
converted for this use) and in the homes of 
relatives, or in abandoned houses and flats. 
While they may have been residing in a 
‘temporary’ home for quite some years –  
and often this was the pre-war home of 
someone now displaced to the other side  
of the inter-entity borderline (IEBL) – very  
few of the displaced were comfortably  
settled, and a large number were living  
in wretched conditions. This, combined  
with homesickness, was the impetus for  
going home. 
In the eastern Bosnian city of Goražde, 
Bosniaks who had been displaced from 
the industrial suburb of Kopači and from 
nearby Višegrad were crowded within the 
city limits. In the northwestern part of the 
country, displaced Bosniaks from Prijedor 
and Kozarac had returned from Croatia but 
were still internally displaced. Many of them 
came back to Sanski Most – not far from their 
homes but still on the far side of the IEBL. 
Displaced Srebrenicans who had not fled 
abroad were living in poor conditions in Tuzla 
and the outskirts of Sarajevo. Meanwhile, 
Croats who had been expelled (by Serb or, 
later, by Bosniak forces) from their ancestral 
homes in central BiH were displaced to 
western BiH or to parts of Croatia. There, 
they occupied homes owned by Serbs who 
had been expelled. And Serbs from Mostar, 
Sarajevo and central BiH had been resettled 
in parts of the Serb-controlled entity. 
All of these ethnically re-concentrated 
populations now formed homogeneous 
voting blocs that leaders on all three sides 
could rely on for support. Those leaders 
therefore had little or no interest in helping 
them return to their pre-war homes. There 
ensued a period wherein, at best, many 
politicians paid only lip service to refugee 
return; much more common was open 
obstruction to return in any direction. 
“Most of us would like to return home. As for 
myself, every morning when I wake up, I ask 
myself, ‘What am I doing here?’ The people of 
Tuzla have become tired of us. We are second-class 
citizens here. Our last name is ‘refugee’.”  
(Zehra, displaced from Bratunac to Tuzla)
It was left to the ordinary people, 
championed by grassroots activists, to fight 
against the post-war geographic and political 
divisions that kept them powerless. Quite 
soon after the end of the war, thousands 
of displaced people mobilised to return 
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to their pre-war homes but it was to be an 
uphill battle. These local activists formed 
organisations to promote their own return 
and that of their communities. Many such 
organisations were supported both by local 
people and by the international community, 
but potential returnees faced obstruction 
and intimidation from local authorities and 
from others who covertly sabotaged return 
efforts. Damaged homes were rebuilt only 
to be bombed again, and returnees were 
assassinated or intimidated into giving up 
and leaving once again. Mines were planted 
on roads in Gacko and Stolac. In late 1999, 
an early returnee to Srebrenica who was 
an employee of the municipal council was 
stabbed and left for dead in the municipal 
building. In that same period, dozens of 
rebuilt homes in Srebrenica were torched. 
The most effective deterrent to return, 
however, was non-violent, with massive 
‘obstruction at the office window’ perpetrated 
by all three sides. Slavenka, who had been 
displaced from Sarajevo, described the 
ordeal she faced when she tried to return: 
“When I returned, I found out that there was 
someone in my apartment. The man who was living 
there … sent me a message that I would never get 
my apartment back. I went to the police and told 
them about that person. They said to me, ‘And what 
should we do, throw him out? We can’t help you.’ I 
went to the municipal offices and to the ministries 
– I knocked on every door, everywhere, and nothing 
happened. Everyone supposedly filled out forms 
and wrote letters but they just lied to me. I went 
around and around for almost a year trying to get 
my apartment back. …they were kicking me around 
like a ball.” 
Tent encampments
The grassroots activists who led dozens 
of local associations campaigning for 
return persisted in their efforts. When 
they were rebuffed by local authorities and 
ignored by international agencies, they 
set up tent encampments in or near the 
villages where they wished to return. 
One of the first organised returns was 
that of Bosniaks to the village of Jušići, not far 
from Zvornik in eastern RS. In October 1996, 
with the encouragement of the prominent 
return activist Fadil Banjanović,2 dozens 
of returnees set up tents and got to work 
clearing rubble from their demolished 
farmhouses. They had to repair an access 
Writing on arch reads: ‘Returnee settlement Sućeska’. Sućeska is a village in the municipality of Srebrenica, and was the first return 
settlement in the municipality. June 2000.
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road to the village and 
watch out for mines, which 
hampered the planting of 
their first crops. During that 
month “there were more 
policemen than returnees, 
to show that we were 
not wanted, even among 
the ruins,” one villager 
reported. Despite threats 
and occasional gunshots, 
the returnees persisted. 
By the spring of 1998 
more than half of the 
pre-war population of 
this village had returned. 
At that point, return to 
numerous villages was underway in that 
part of the Republika Srpska. In Jušići, 
returnees began to install telephone poles 
in order to access electrical power from the 
Federation but the RS authorities ordered 
the poles to be removed. Returning children 
were bussed across the IEBL to attend 
schools in the Federation. With time, the 
security situation around Jušići improved 
but transportation and water supply 
remained a problem for several years. 
Activists for return found ways to attract 
the attention and support of international 
officials, demonstrating in front of embassies 
and near the headquarters of the Office 
of the High Representative. In the snowy 
months of late 1999 the establishment of a 
tent settlement, hard by the IEBL separating 
Goražde from the RS, prompted criticism 
on the part of some international officials. 
The tent encampment, housing dozens of 
would-be returnees, was perched on a hill 
above Kopači; on the tents, hand-painted 
signs read “Kopači is the key to Annex 7” 
and “Kopači is the key to return”. In his office 
in Tuzla, Fadil Banjanović told me, “There 
is no alternative to return. We are for return 
in all directions. We won’t call it two-way 
return, or minority return – just return. We 
are an organisation that doesn’t hold panel 
discussions, or publish lofty declarations.”
In response to pressure like this, 
international officials finally began to make 
significant changes to support return in 1999.3 
They promulgated laws against obstruction 
and removed some of the worst offenders. By 
the end of the 1990s, return picked up, and in 
the next couple of years it peaked and several 
hundred thousand displaced people managed 
to return to their pre-war homes. Not only did 
Bosniaks return to parts of the Serb-controlled 
entity and western BiH; Serbs and Croats 
returned to their pre-war homes as well. 
However, the fact that the warlords and 
their political heirs remained in power meant 
that return did not happen on a greater 
scale. In some places, such as Višegrad, no 
significant return took place, and in others, 
such as Prijedor and Zvornik municipalities, 
at its peak return only amounted to some 
50% of the pre-war displaced population. 
Difficulties with recovery
In the period since return levelled off, the 
demographic map of BiH has hardened with 
some 10-20% of returnees living in their pre-
war homes. The age of the returnees is skewed 
towards the older part of the population. 
Younger people who spent a significant part 
of their formative years in their new homes 
found ways to remain there, and thousands 
have left the country altogether since the war. 
Preliminary results from the autumn 2013 
national census point to a current population 
of 3.7 million, compared to the pre-war 
population of 4.4 million.4 Thus, in the last 
decade and more, public discussion of return 
refers to the sustainability of return that has 
Sign on tent reads: ‘Kopači is the key to Annex 7 for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Tent 
encampment on the edge of Goražde, above the village of Kopači. November 1999.
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already taken place, rather than to significant 
additional return. But there are three notable 
problems that confound recovery in Bosnia. 
The most salient problem is the lack 
of economic recovery, with the official 
unemployment rate among all ethnicities 
remaining upwards of 40%. In places where 
there is a returnee population, the returnees 
are the last to receive the few jobs that are 
available, and those who would establish 
a business of their own face prohibitive 
red tape and fees for permits. Where local 
development projects are implemented, 
priority is given to the dominant ethnicity. 
Discrimination in education is an 
additional, serious problem. In the 
Federation, Croat and Bosniak pupils 
are taught separately in the ‘two schools 
under one roof’ system in more than 50 
locations.5 In Croat-dominated Stolac, 
Bosniak pupils enter through the back 
door, and Croats through the front. 
The separation between ethnicities that 
speak the same language and have nearly 
the same history and customs keeps tension 
simmering, and it is in this atmosphere, 
prevalent throughout BiH, that activists 
endeavour to unite people in the cause of 
citizens’ rights and against corruption. 
During the period of refugee return, the 
most effective activists collaborated across 
ethnic lines and advocated for return in 
all directions. Today, the struggle against 
corruption and discrimination is likewise 
most effective where 
returnees can unite with 
young members of the 
majority ethnicity. Instances 
of young people expressing 
their conscience have 
increased in recent years; 
Odisej in Bratunac, although 
now no longer in operation, 
was one example of cross-
ethnic collaboration,6 and in 
Prijedor, the organization 
Kvart7 boasts exemplary 
collaboration between 
intelligent, sincere young 
Serbs and returnee activists. 
It is difficult to be 
hopeful in BiH, where the Dayton straitjacket 
reinforces separation and the country’s 
leaders continue to implement their 
predecessors’ war goals by quasi-legal means. 
Ultimately, recovery will come when a new 
generation of domestic leaders applies itself 
to the well-being of the ordinary people. 
Just as important, change will not happen 
without the involvement of the mass of 
ordinary people, led by activists they can 
trust. With increased cooperation between 
returnees and open-minded local people of 
all ethnicities, true recovery can take place. 
Peter Lippman pl52ip@hotmail.com 
Human rights activist and an independent 
researcher specialising in the former Yugoslavia. 
http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal.htm
1. I lived in BiH from mid-1997 to mid-1999, and have visited the 
country for extensive periods since then, as a researcher focusing 
on grassroots human rights campaigns – the campaign for return, 
and then other campaigns such as those for memorialisation and 
against discrimination.
2. Then director of Tuzla Canton’s Office for Return of Displaced 
Persons.
3. Under the Bonn powers decreed in December 1997 by the 
Dayton-established Peace Implementation Council, the Office of 
the High Representative was empowered to promulgate laws for 
BiH, as well as to remove domestic politicians from office.
4. As of August 2015, the final results had still not been released.
5. See article by Perry V ‘Wartime division in peacetime schools’, 
pp26-7.
6. See http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2008-4.htm 
7. http://centarzamladekvartprijedor.blogspot.co.uk/ (Bosnian 
only)
Communal building above Kopači, used by inhabitants of the Goražde tent encampment for 
return. November 1999.
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Human rights shortcomings of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement 
Lisbeth Pilegaard and Jasminka Dzumhur
When a peace agreement guarantees the rights of certain groups but not all, limitations to 
the enjoyment of human rights are inevitable.
The Dayton Peace Agreement which ended 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
established the rights of the country’s 
‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs. The result of this has been that anyone 
who does not identify themselves with these 
groupings is highly limited in their exercise 
of rights, leading to the marginalisation 
of specific categories of the population. 
The United Nations (UN) Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
highlighted this in 2006, expressing 
its concern that “the State and Entity 
Constitutions allocate certain authority 
to, and confer specific rights exclusively 
on, members of the ‘constituent peoples’ 
(Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs), and that 
persons not belonging to one of these 
ethnic groups are formally referred to as 
‘Others’.” The Committee urged “that the 
State Party ensure that all rights provided 
by law are granted, both in law and in face, 
to every person on the territory of the State 
Party, irrespective of race or ethnicity.”1
The country is still witnessing a 
number of returns, yet there are continued 
concerns for the security situation of 
‘minority returnees’,2 with allegations of 
harassment, intimidation and other forms 
of violence, including murder.3 Politicians 
also continue to use nationalist rhetoric, 
often directed against minority returnees.
Annex 6 and equality of access
Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
established a Commission on Human Rights 
comprising a Human Rights Chamber and 
an Office of the Ombudsman. Together, 
these two are obliged to investigate: 
a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights 
as provided in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the Protocols thereto, or 
b) alleged or apparent discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status 
arising in the enjoyment of any of the rights 
and freedoms provided for in the international 
agreements… where such violation is alleged or 
appears to have been committed by the Parties, 
including by any official or organ of the Parties, 
Cantons, Municipalities, or any individual 
acting under the authority of such official or 
organ.
The institution of the Ombudsman works to 
provide equal accessibility for all vulnerable, 
marginalised groups, and its annual reports 
indicate that IDPs still have difficulties 
accessing social protection and welfare, 
creating obstacles to their sustainable return.4 
The division of responsibilities among 
different levels of government (state, entity, 
canton and municipality) in the area of 
economic and social rights obstructs access 
to those rights, with a lack of clarity as to 
where responsibility lies. The consequence 
is that progress in the protection of human 
rights, in establishing rule of law and 
in improving governance and economic 
development has remained static in BiH. 
At the same time, although the difficult 
economic situation in BiH affects the country 
as a whole, it has a more severe impact on 
vulnerable groups such as minority returnees, 
the Roma and female-headed households. 
The lack of sustainable solutions for IDPs 
and returnees continues, as does widespread 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, 
gender and political affiliation. Furthermore, 
post-war reforms of governance instruments 
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and national legislation have been undertaken 
with little or no public and expert consultation 
and without sensitivity to the needs of 
vulnerable groups, including IDPs. Laws 
have often been pushed through without 
sufficient budgetary planning, with the result 
that rights are de jure prescribed but not able 
to be realised in practice.5 There is concern 
that many of the measures undertaken have 
actually resulted in an increase in poverty 
and slower economic development, which 
again will have more serious consequences 
for the most vulnerable groups. 
Inadequate protection for  
vulnerable groups
Various UN treaty bodies (charged with 
monitoring implementation of the core 
international human rights treaties) have 
pointed out – in regard to access to economic 
and social rights by vulnerable groups – the 
lack of direct application of Conventions; 
the lack of programmes for reduction of 
unemployment, particularly among women; 
and inadequate mechanisms for monitoring 
and redress. Their recommendations, 
however, have not been taken into serious 
consideration by the BiH government. 
As a result, injustice and inadequacies 
in protection and fulfilment of the rights 
of these groups remain one of the main 
challenges in transitional justice in BiH. 
Victims of torture, including survivors 
of sexual violence, are granted only 
minimal protection under the umbrella 
category of ‘civilian victims of war’ in 
entity laws. Female victims of sexual 
violence are even more vulnerable, and 
face serious economic, housing, social and 
psychological issues; their often multiple 
vulnerabilities are not adequately recognised 
by laws (e.g. on health care, IDPs, social 
protection, etc) nor addressed in practice. 
Two of the causes are the absence of 
state-level legislation regulating the rights 
of victims, and the lack of harmonisation of 
those relevant laws that do exist. Access to 
health care for survivors of torture, including 
sexual violence, is limited to basic services 
(in the Federation) or connected to IDP 
status (in the Republika Srpska) but in both 
entities the specific needs of these categories 
are almost entirely neglected. Psychosocial 
support and counselling are only provided 
by the NGO sector, which is not able to cover 
all the needs. Monthly support allowances 
can be shamefully low, and for some this 
can be a source of re-victimisation. 
The situation of the group labelled 
‘women war victims of sexual violence’ 
illustrates how multiple vulnerabilities are 
not adequately dealt with and thus how 
the state is failing to provide adequate 
reparation to victims. These are women who 
are additionally disadvantaged as female 
heads of household and IDPs and who were 
or are facing eviction from accommodation 
they were provided as IDPs. Due to the 
provisions of the Law on Refugees from BiH 
and Displaced Persons in BiH they were (or 
are) under pressure to return to their pre-
war places of residence – where they may be 
exposed to additional trauma, including the 
possibility of having to face the perpetrators.6 
The burden is placed on IDPs to show 
they have grounds for refusing to return, 
since the Law prescribes that they lose 
their IDP status if the conditions exist for 
safe and dignified return to the pre-war 
place of residence. However, the law does 
not define conditions for safe and dignified 
return, nor does it take into consideration 
that safe and dignified return for survivors 
of torture can require significantly different 
conditions from those for IDPs not suffering 
from multiple vulnerabilities. Moreover, 
every time the survivors face a new eviction 
they are additionally re-traumatised, and 
their marginalisation is reinforced. 
Conclusion
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive 
assessment of the effects of implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement on IDPs, 
with particular attention paid to the 
implementation of the recommendations 
of the UN treaty bodies and the Universal 
Periodic Review.7 A human rights-based 
approach should be used in all spheres 
of life in BiH, focusing on the needs of 
vulnerable groups and ensuring that 
returnees can access their rights relating 
34 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement
FM
R
 5
0
September 2015www.fmreview.org/dayton20
to social protection, health care, education, 
housing, employment and security. 
Lisbeth Pilegaard pilegaardlisbeth@gmail.com 
Consultant and Humanitarian Adviser to the UN 
High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing.
Jasminka Dzumhur 
jdzumhur@ombudsmen.gov.ba 
Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, 2006. Supplement No 18 A/61/18, para 31.   
www.refworld.org/pdfid/45c30ba90.pdf
2. Displaced persons returning to areas of origin where their 
ethnic group is now in the minority.
3. OSCE (November 2012) Tackling Hate Crimes: An analysis 
of bias-motivated incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
recommendations www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_
doc_2012111310235235eng.pdf; European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (February 2011) ECRI Report on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (fourth monitoring cycle)  
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/bosnia_
herzegovina/BIH-CBC-IV-2011-002-ENG.pdf
4. (March 2015) Annual Report on the Results of the Activities of 
the Institution of the Ombudsman for Human Rights of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for 2014 www.ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti.
aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=En
5. The best example for this assertion is the Gender Law (text 
at http://tinyurl.com/BiH-Gender-Law-2003), which states that: 
“competent authorities shall undertake appropriate measures on 
all levels in order to implement provisions of the Gender Law,” 
including “the adoption of planned measures designed to achieve 
gender equality in all fields and at all levels of governance”. This 
has not happened yet.
6. www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/laws-and-policies/
bosnia
7. www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BASession20.aspx
If women are left out of peace talks
Gorana Mlinarević, Nela Porobić Isaković and Madeleine Rees
The exclusion of women from the process of making peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
diminished the prospects for sustainable peace. When will we learn that no peace can be 
sustainable and just without the active and meaningful participation of women?
The narrative of war commonly portrays 
women as victims only, taking away their 
agency and leaving them voiceless in the 
reconstruction of their country. However, 
women’s experiences as victims of violence 
and women’s active participation in peace 
making and peace building are not mutually 
exclusive, and both aspects need to be 
recognised when negotiating peace. 
During the peace process that preceded 
the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
in 1995 not a single woman participated, 
whether as lead mediator, witness, member 
of the negotiation team or signatory.1 This 
absence of women in the formal peace 
process has had concrete consequences 
both for the society as a whole and also 
for women as a distinct group in the 
society and their ability to be recognised 
as agents of change in later processes.  
In Dayton, the space at the negotiating 
table was open only to men who had the 
power of armed forces behind them. Under 
the pretence of securing human rights, 
those male elites succeeded in agreeing the 
formula for the division of territory. Today, 
BiH is paralysed by the disfunctionality of 
the central state apparatus and the ethno-
nationalistic politics that are the common 
drivers for the two entities created by 
Dayton.2 There has been no serious attempt 
by the domestic political elite to include 
women’s perspectives in discussions 
regarding constitutional reforms, nor 
were women able to get support from 
the international community involved in 
facilitating these talks. The rationale – or 
excuse – is that women are de facto included 
through participation in BiH political 
and institutional life, including their 
membership of political parties. However, 
the reality is different, and women are not 
sufficiently or adequately represented. 
The absence of women during peace 
negotiations is not unique to BiH. In 2012 
UN Women published a review of 31 peace 
processes, showing that only 4% of peace 
agreements had women as signatories. More 
recently, at the Geneva II peace talks for Syria, 
despite support from states and international 
NGOs and the existence of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on 
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women, peace and security,3 Syrian women 
were kept out of the peace talks. Not only 
is this patently an affront to international 
legal obligations but it is also quite simply a 
tragic waste. Yet, when prominent women’s 
international and local Syrian organisations 
asked the UN to ensure the inclusion of 
women in the Syrian peace negotiations 
in 2014, they were told that the “political 
situation is complicated”. We know that. 
But the solution is not to perpetuate the 
divisiveness that led the country into war in 
the first place. Research clearly shows that 
the only peace treaties that have brought 
sustainable peace are those which have been 
drafted with the participation of women 
and with the clear inclusion of a gender 
analysis in drawing up the framework for 
the conclusion of conflict, for transition, 
and for the future path of the nation.4   
Creating space for inclusion and 
participation
Sharing women’s experiences concerning 
peace negotiations and post-war life has 
become an imperative for feminist peace 
activists in order to create spaces for 
women’s meaningful inclusion and active 
participation in the making of peace. Since 
2013 a number of women’s organisations 
and women activists in BiH, facilitated by 
the Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom, started to work to counteract 
the exclusionist mentality of the political 
elites through an initiative called ‘Women 
organizing for change in Syria and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’. The starting idea was 
that the hard lessons learned by Bosnian 
women – both during the war and afterwards 
– need to be analysed and used to develop 
new, improved strategies for the active and 
meaningful participation of women in peace 
processes. This knowledge could be shared 
with other women in similar situations so that 
mistakes can be avoided and good practices 
considered and contextualised. At the same 
time, the opportunity is being used to find 
new paths towards the creation of a women’s 
movement grounded in feminist principles 
in BiH that will be able to act beyond the 
ethno-nationalistic politics of division.5 
The women activists from BiH identified 
successful stories but also many failures 
over the past 20 years. Most of the failures 
can be traced to two things: firstly, a flawed 
peace agreement, the purpose of which was 
to end the armed conflict but which did not 
contain the necessary elements for creating 
‘Mothers of Prijedor’ at a demonstration marking International Day of the Disappeared, 30th August.
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sustainable peace, and, secondly, the fact 
that women and civil society had no part in 
negotiating that peace. 
During the war, women were actively 
engaged in addressing the consequences 
of the violence and in activities vital to the 
survival of communities; they provided 
assistance to internally displaced people 
and to women victims of sexual violence; 
they went to work – braving snipers and 
shelling – to keep factories working; and some 
worked on cross-community dialogue in the 
midst of war. Yet there was no mechanism 
to carry those experiences across into the 
formal peace negotiations. The UNSCR 1325, 
which called for the active and meaningful 
participation of women in all phases of peace 
building and peace making, was adopted 
five years after the end of the war in Bosnia.  
After the war women continued 
organising, some to demand the truth about 
missing family members, others to demand 
inclusion of women in formal politics. Some 
women also led the difficult process of return, 
often to sites where many of them had lost 
their close family members or been victimised 
themselves. They were the ones with hands-
on experience of what it would take to make 
the return a sustainable one – not just the 
return of property (which was the main focus 
of the international community) but also 
access to economic, social and political rights.  
Failure to engage with gender issues
Many of the problems that arose after the 
war could have been avoided had there been 
more serious political engagement – involving 
women’s civil society representatives and 
gender-competent advisors – during the peace 
talks. Domestic violence, trafficking, health 
care, education, employment – these are all 
gender-related issues and should have been 
factored into a carefully planned transition 
in post-war BiH. Instead, issues recognised 
as being ‘serious’ and of ethno-national 
interest (such as education) or of particular 
importance for the political economy (such 
as employment and health care) were used 
to consolidate both ethno-nationalistic and 
neoliberal positions. Jurisdiction over these 
issues had already been divided between 
the different ethno-nationalist elites at 
Dayton, without addressing any of the 
discriminatory or gendered aspects of these. 
On the other hand, the issues recognised 
as exclusively ‘women’s issues’ – and therefore 
not of particular importance for power or 
resources redistribution – were ignored at 
Dayton and left to be dealt with by women’s 
organisations. The classic example is 
domestic violence, the least ethno-politically 
sensitive issue. BiH women were given 
space to tackle this, and the male political 
elite did not interfere substantively given 
that domestic violence portrays women as 
victims not as power holders or decision 
makers; although the causes of domestic 
violence were not addressed adequately, new 
and improved laws on domestic violence 
were passed, driven by women NGOs and 
carried into parliament by women MPs. 
The issue of wartime sexual violence, 
however, remains a heavily politicised 
question. Nationalisms seek to profit from 
a narrative of the atrocities committed by 
others to “their women”. This objectification 
and commodification were reflected in the 
way in which the peace process evolved, 
in particular in relation to access to justice. 
Instead of embracing an approach to 
address and ameliorate the situation of 
survivors that seeks also to have a broader, 
transformative impact on society, the 
reaction of parts of the elite has been at best 
ambivalent, at worst co-optive. Some of the 
issues raised by the women’s groups related 
to the question of transformative redress. 
The response, however, was to ‘grant’ a 
form of compensation that was more a 
social support benefit than reparation to 
address wartime abuses, effectively forcing 
women into becoming dependent on social 
welfare. Even this form of compensation 
was not given to all survivors but only 
to those who live in the Federation and 
who fulfil a set of (problematic) criteria.
Consequently, over the past 20 years 
Bosnian NGOs have had to develop 
considerable expertise when it comes 
to provision of services such as medical 
assistance and psychosocial support. Official 
institutions, meanwhile, such as centres 
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for mental health care and centres for 
social welfare, have done little or nothing 
to improve their capacity for provision of 
support and services. As a result, survivors 
today get support only through the NGOs, 
which remain dependent on foreign donor 
support to continue their vital work. 
There is an inherent link between 
the way in which such services have 
been ‘outsourced’ and the achievement 
of real justice. The formal justice aspects 
of post-war BiH that were created (the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, etc) have provided a 
framework for criminal accountability 
but have failed in terms of providing 
comprehensive justice. The understanding of 
justice has been too narrow, confined to the 
prosecution and conviction of perpetrators 
(and in the beginning these were also the 
demands from the victims themselves). 
Establishing these formal justice 
mechanisms, however, should have been 
complemented by paying real and serious 
attention to social and economic rights, and 
the post-war reconstruction of BiH should 
have been supported by a transformative 
transitional process. The identification 
of what was needed could only be done 
by an inclusive process, and the absence 
of women made the failure inevitable. 
This continues to pose a challenge, as 
the space lost at the negotiating table 
has proven impossible to regain. 
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Interpretations of Annex 7: assessing the impact  
on non-returnees in the UK
Gayle Munro 
Emphasising the crucial role of refugee returns to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina risks 
minimising the agency of those who choose not to exercise their rights under Annex 7.
The majority of people from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) living in the United 
Kingdom (UK) today made the decision 
to leave their home country and make a 
temporary or permanent new home in 
the UK as a direct result of the 1992-95 
war in BiH. Those coming to the UK in 
the 1990s would have been part of one of 
three groups: those arriving as a part of 
the UK government’s Bosnia Project (a 
group made up of 1,000 people who had 
been identified by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees or the Red Cross 
as being particularly vulnerable, many of 
whom were former concentration camp 
detainees); those making their journey 
independently; or medical evacuees. 
The reliability of quantitative data on 
migration to the UK prevents any accurate 
estimates on the numbers of people from BiH 
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still resident in the UK, although community 
representatives estimate the number to be 
approximately 10,000. Many of those who 
fled the conflict will have since returned – 
and it is of course entirely appropriate that, 
following a violent conflict, those who want 
to return ‘home’ should be able to exercise 
the right to do so. However, the question of 
choice or agency on the part of those who 
have had so much taken from them already is 
one which is interesting to explore, especially 
given the wider rhetoric on migration and 
asylum in the European (and wider) context.1
Insistence on return
There are many who argue that the ‘success’ 
of Dayton rests on the implementation of 
Annex 7 and refugee return, and indeed the 
international community is keen to emphasise 
the importance of the return of IDPs and 
refugees. But it is interesting to consider the 
potential motivation(s) behind the insistence 
on the importance of refugee return. 
Is such insistence, as some have pointed 
out, motivated by the desire to emphasise that 
the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not to be 
rewarded with territorial gains?2 Could part of 
the desire for ‘successful’ refugee return be an 
attempt to assuage any residual guilt over the 
catastrophic results of the collective failure 
of the international community to intervene 
positively in BiH at an earlier stage in the war? 
There is increasing reluctance on the 
part of many European governments to offer 
permanent refuge to those fleeing conflicts, 
and the practice during the 1990s was to offer 
‘temporary protection’ to refugees from the 
Bosnian war (Germany and the UK being 
two examples). The international community 
presents return as crucial not only for the 
long-term success of the peace treaty but also 
for the eventual emotional well-being of those 
who were displaced. Is there a possibility, 
however, that the increasingly unforgiving 
immigration legislation of some European 
governments is contributing to the rhetoric 
around the importance of refugee return?  
It is inevitable that discussions around 
reconciliation will be, to say the least, 
politically and emotionally charged, in a 
country where so many of those responsible 
for causing so much pain have not been 
brought to justice. In that sense, the insistence 
on refugee return as being the lynchpin of a 
successful Dayton,3 while ostensibly aiming 
to ensure the protection of returning refugees, 
could be interpreted as having a more subtle 
and insidious sub-text. In post-conflict 
BiH and its neighbours, where meaningful 
reconciliation measures on the part of the 
perpetrators are few and far between, Annex 
7 places the weight of expectation on the 
victim. Survivors of the war are already very 
familiar with the guilt of the living. In placing 
such an emphasis on their return and the 
return of others like them, there is the danger 
of increasing the emotional burden on those 
who may have already had their resilience 
tested not only by the horror of the war 
itself but also by the sometimes considerable 
stresses of the experience of migration. 
Of those refugees from BiH whom 
I interviewed during the course of my 
research,4 the average length of wait for 
a decision on their migration status was 
seven years, with the longest wait being 
thirteen years.5 Interviewees spoke of the 
feeling of intense physical and emotional 
displacement on realising that, after leaving 
homes shelled or burned to the ground or 
having been forced to renounce any rights 
to their properties, what was on offer in the 
country of ‘refuge’ was temporariness and 
uncertainty; they faced years in limbo without 
the right to work or the documentation 
necessary to facilitate temporary return 
without potentially jeopardising the 
outcome of their asylum claim. 
It could be argued that the belief that 
refugee return is essential for the future 
of BiH paradoxically risks overlooking the 
rights of some of those most vulnerable 
refugees. It would after all be difficult to 
underestimate the accumulated and corrosive 
effect on the mental and emotional health of 
a refugee who, after surviving the war and its 
aftershocks and the UK immigration system, 
is then subjected to the emotional guilt-trip 
which the pressure of the ‘refugee return is 
essential for Bosnia’ argument could trigger. 
While implementation of Annex 7 
is crucial for the protection of the rights 
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The role of remote voting in encouraging return 
Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides
Once there is a genuine possibility of going home, what influences a forced migrant’s 
decision to return to a pre-conflict residence, often in the face of very difficult conditions? 
What role can remote voting play?
Victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ have returned 
home in significant numbers all over Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) but no municipality 
has been as successful in peacefully reversing 
ethnic cleansing as the Drvar region in 
western BiH. In 1991, 97% of Drvar’s 17,000 
inhabitants were Serbs. After the September 
1995 offensive by Croat forces, the only 
original inhabitants who remained were 83 
older people in isolated villages. However, 
by 2000, Serb returnees represented 70% 
of the local population, making Drvar the 
first municipality in which the pre-war 
majority was restored via peaceful returns.1
Not only did former residents from Drvar 
region start returning in large numbers before 
the country-wide turn of the tide in 1999-2000 
but they won municipal elections, gained 
significant representation in the police force 
and local administration, and recovered the 
demographic majority status they had had 
before the war. This was achieved despite 
bitter resistance to return from some quarters.
This article combines findings of fieldwork 
conducted in Drvar region in 2011 with 
data collected in BiH in June and July 2013,2 
including data on both currently displaced 
people and returnees. Survey-focused work 
on displaced persons is relatively rare, for a 
number of reasons. It is frequently risky in 
terms of the personal security of interviewees, 
is politically sensitive and is difficult to carry 
out with a representative sample of displaced 
respondents. In conflict zones, forced 
migrants represent vulnerable but mobile 
populations; while their vulnerability makes 
them extremely important for social science 
enquiries, their mobility makes it equally 
challenging to determine representativeness 
in the sampling procedures. Such studies 
consequently often focus on available 
populations in designated refugee camps 
or neighbourhoods, overlooking those 
displaced persons who are more integrated 
within the broader population. In the end, 
governments, international organisations 
of those refugees and IDPs who do wish 
to return, it is also important that the 
rights of those who have chosen to make 
their homes elsewhere are recognised. 
Acceptance of the decision of these refugees 
not to return would be a positive step 
towards recognising and celebrating that 
refugee ‘agency’ so often lamented as 
missing in studies of forced migration.6 
Gayle Munro gayle.munro@salvationarmy.org.uk 
Research Manager, The Salvation Army. 
www.salvationarmy.org.uk  
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and NGOs are often forced to make decisions 
without consulting vulnerable groups.
Reflecting the importance both of security 
concerns and of memories of home in making 
decisions about return, our data indicates 
that women and those who experienced 
wartime victimisation are less likely to 
return. Likewise, older Bosnians with positive 
memories of pre-conflict inter-ethnic relations 
are more likely to return than younger 
persons or those with negative memories. 
Better-educated forced migrants are less likely 
to return, which is probably related to their 
easier economic integration in their new place 
of residence. Young women are the least likely 
to return, which might be related to greater 
opportunities for women in urban Bosnia 
(or Western countries of exile) compared to 
small-town or rural Bosnia. Finally, persons 
displaced from areas experiencing high levels 
of return are more likely to return themselves.
The Bosnian return experience points 
to several limitations of internationally 
sponsored peacekeeping. Even in the 
townships where community effort led to 
successful returns, the mass return was 
generally not followed by well-designed and 
well-funded local economic development 
programmes. Consequently, many returnees 
left again but this time primarily for economic 
reasons – to find jobs. While BiH’s cities were 
once genuinely multi-ethnic, they are now 
overwhelmingly mono-ethnic. However, 
there have been examples of successful 
returns in smaller, mono-ethnic townships or 
villages, most notably in the Drvar region. 
The Coalition for Drvar
The Drvar association of displaced 
persons (the Coalition for Drvar) was formed 
when it became clear to those wishing 
to return that the authorities in different 
parts of BiH were not truly interested in 
implementing the right of return. One of 
the first achievements of the Coalition for 
Drvar’s leaders was to convince followers 
to vote in their pre-war hometowns, against 
the wishes of those who were counting 
on the votes of displaced Serbs in order to 
consolidate their own control in the parts of 
BiH which were now predominantly Serb. 
Annex 3 Article IV of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement stipulates that “a citizen who 
no longer lives in the municipality in which 
he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general 
rule, be expected to vote, in person or by 
absentee ballot, in that municipality.”3 This 
electoral provision permitted refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to cast 
absentee ballots in their pre-war home 
cities and in 1997, for example, Mile Marčeta 
was elected by absentee ballot as mayor 
of Drvar. Described by the international 
media as a “symbol of hope in a land of 
hate”, the mayor convinced around 1,600 
to 2,000 displaced persons to accompany 
him back to the municipality. Despite Croat 
resistance, the assassination of two elderly 
returnees and an assassination attempt 
against Marčeta himself, forced migrants 
managed to re-establish themselves on 
their land. The Coalition for Drvar not only 
Mixed groups of Serb and Croat returnees living in Bukve village, 2001.
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helped reverse ethnic cleansing but also 
played a leading role in mobilising support 
from the international community as well as 
locally among the multi-ethnic country-wide 
Coalition for the Return of the Expelled.
The theme poster of the Coalition for Drvar was a 
large yellow map of all Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
a picture of a house with a little chimney. “Hocu 
kuci,” it says. “I want to go home.”
The Drvar experience highlights the 
importance of remote voting for successful 
returns. In Drvar many IDPs have 
continued to have a vote in their pre-conflict 
municipalities, even while in exile. As per 
Article 20.8 of the Bosnian Election Law, 
distant voting for displaced persons will 
remain in place until decided otherwise 
by the UN High Representative or the 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.4 Voting 
rights was a key element of the Dayton 
architecture – in contrast to other UN-led 
peace mediations such as the Annan Plan 
for Cyprus which included significant 
restrictions on the political rights of displaced 
persons. To prevent situations arising in post-
conflict societies where municipal authorities 
represent exclusively either new or old 
inhabitants but not both, peace settlements 
should combine remote voting with – what 
was missing from Dayton – power-sharing 
systems at the local level.5 Such institutional 
mechanisms could allow refugees and 
IDPs to maintain financial, institutional 
and political ties with their home region.
Could cases of successful return in 
BiH be replicated in other post-conflict 
societies? While some conditions appear 
to be unique to Bosnia and hard to 
replicate – such as the massive presence 
of the international agencies in a de facto 
protectorate – others might work elsewhere. 
If a post-conflict settlement enables forced 
migrants to vote in local elections in the 
place of displacement (by a remote voting 
mechanism), forced migrants might be able 
to peacefully regain a stake in local political 
institutions and be encouraged to return. 
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Home after Dayton: IDPs in Sarajevo 
Gruia Badescu
The experiences of displaced people in Sarajevo show that living in a place that people 
perceive to be safe and to provide opportunities can be more desirable than returning to 
one’s place of origin. Participatory urban projects can help foster the sense of community 
which is still missing.
It is estimated that about 90,000 current 
residents of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), lived elsewhere in 
BiH before the war. Some came to Sarajevo 
to seek work in the years after the war but 
for many life in Sarajevo began as a result of 
displacement during the war. In many places 
around the world, urban IDPs as a category 
with a specific profile are ignored by local 
authorities or in some cases are singled out 
negatively. The experience of displaced people 
who now live in post-Dayton Sarajevo can 
help inform action and policy both in BiH and 
in urban displacement contexts elsewhere. 
Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords stipulated 
the right of IDPs to return specifically to 
their “homes of origin”, rather than the 
more common UNHCR “return to country 
of origin” framework. This specificity was 
grounded in the desire of international actors 
to reverse the ‘ethnic cleansing’ which they 
did not stop during the war. In addition, it 
was also linked to a view that people are 
rooted in a particular place. This is what 
Roger Zetter calls the “myth of home”, where 
the emphasis is on the geographical location 
of a place that is considered to remain 
‘home’ no matter what. As a result, in post-
Dayton BiH, there was an emphasis on the 
restitution of property and return. At first 
glance, this was successful, as many people 
reclaimed their property and BiH witnessed 
over a million returns. In practice, however, 
many recovered their property and then 
sold it to others, mostly to those of the new 
majority group in the respective localities. 
Seeking cool ground
The alternative to this ‘home return’ approach 
is a ‘looking for cool ground’ approach 
where people’s decision to remain elsewhere 
is connected to feelings of safety and the 
opportunities they find in their new locations.1 
For many displaced Bosnians, the return to 
their pre-war homes would imply living as a 
minority amidst another ethnic group, and 
that could instil feelings of insecurity or fear 
of conflict. Furthermore, with the collapse of 
the socialist industrial economy, this return 
would imply a choice between unemployment 
and living off the land, which the younger 
generations are not so inclined to do. 
Places that represent ‘cool ground’, on the 
other hand, would provide security, in the 
sense both of being shielded from possible 
animosity, resentment or conflict and of 
having better prospects for employment. 
While for some this cool ground was a 
foreign country, others found it in big 
cities like Sarajevo, where the economy 
was better than elsewhere in BiH. Living 
among people with whom one shares a 
language and often a religious and overall 
cultural code was preferable for some to 
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living elsewhere and having to negotiate 
different languages and cultures. 
Most displaced people in Sarajevo whom 
I interviewed told me that they feel at home 
in the city.2 For some, feeling at home was a 
matter of spending enough time in a place 
and getting accustomed to it. For others, 
feeling at home meant being surrounded by 
supportive and engaging social networks. 
For some, Sarajevo became home as it is a 
relatively large city and thus a place both 
of anonymity and of discovery. For others, 
however, the size of the city caused loneliness 
and hampered a sense of community. 
One obstacle to feeling at home in Sarajevo 
is a perception of animosity and arrogance 
shown by the pre-war local population. 
As the majority of the displaced were of 
the same ethnicity and religion as the new 
demographic and political majority in the city 
(i.e. Bosniaks), one might expect that their 
integration would be smooth, facilitated by 
the authorities and embraced by the local 
population. What actually happened defies 
this assumption. Locals invoke the notion of 
a Sarajevo spirit, Sarajevski duh, to express the 
refined urban culture of Sarajevo, and depict 
the newcomers as rural, primitive, traditional, 
religiously radical – all traits assembled 
under the umbrella of ‘uncultured people’, 
nekulturni, who are unable to adjust to the city. 
A number of the urban IDPs whom 
I interviewed discussed the perceived 
differences between the rural (‘uneducated’) 
and urban (‘educated’) newcomers:
“Taxi drivers talk about all those people who came 
here: …[the newcomers] are uneducated, they don’t 
know how to behave, they throw rubbish from the 
windows and not in the bins, and all these stupid 
things. I am sure there are some like that but that 
does not make a pattern. I am educated, I do not 
throw rubbish out of my window….” (Vedad, 44)
“There is a lot of animosity. People believe that 
being born in some place is more noble. But then 
you ask – […] you think that just by being born 
here, you are better?” (Nihad, 47)
The persistence of divisions within 
Sarajevo’s urban population indicates that 
providing housing,3 employment and support 
networks needs to be complemented by 
community development. The divisions 
between groups can be moderated by 
concentrating on common challenges and 
opportunities, by working on a common 
vision to benefit all. One area where this can 
happen is urban planning and development. 
Interviews reveal that for most residents, 
displaced or not, the problems of urban 
living are similar – relating to employment, 
traffic, urban amenities – and working 
together to address these issues could help 
to cement the feeling of community. 
Humanitarian actors need to pay more 
attention to urban issues and the needs of 
urban IDPs. One possible avenue of action 
would be for humanitarian actors to advocate 
to local authorities the need to involve local 
residents of all backgrounds – including 
IDPs – in small community projects (working 
with local community NGOs) and in wider 
participatory planning and development 
schemes. It is important, however, not to 
single out IDPs in poor communities and 
thereby risk creating animosities between 
the host community and IDPs; any projects 
should rather address the overall structural 
problems of the area and the concerns 
of all residents.4 Such an approach will 
foster people’s sense of belonging and 
facilitate a more inclusive urban vision. 
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director Dr Selma Porobic for her support. My research on IDPs 
did not include East Sarajevo (in Republika Srpska); for a study 
of Sarajevo Serb IDPs in East Sarajevo see Armakolas I ‘Sarajevo 
No More? Identity and the Experience of Place among Bosnian 
Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska’, in Bougarel X, Helms E 
and Duijzings G (Eds) (2007) The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, 
Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society. Ashgate.
3. Housing availability was, unusually for IDPs, not a problem 
in Sarajevo at the end of the war as most of the Sarajevo Serbs 
had fled the city, vacating properties. More, low-cost informal 
construction took place on the hills surrounding the city. 
4. Known as area-based integrated urban development.
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The compound effects of conflict and disaster 
displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Wesli H Turner
Some IDPs living in protracted displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as many Roma 
IDPs, were especially vulnerable to the effects of the May 2014 flooding and landslides.
Over a few days in May 2014, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) experienced the 
heaviest rainfall reported in 120 years. 
The deluge led to the flooding of the rivers 
Bosna, Drina, Una, Sava and Vrbas and 
their tributaries, damaging 43,000 homes 
and triggering landslides that destroyed a 
further 1,952 homes in 81 municipalities.1 
The floods affected more than 1.5 million 
people (nearly 39% of the population) 
and displaced around 90,000 people. 
Many of those displaced by the floods 
were IDP returnees, formerly displaced 
persons who had integrated locally, and 
IDPs still living in protracted displacement 
following the conflict, and already vulnerable 
groups such as victims of wartime sexual 
violence and landmine victims. Once again 
they were forced to flee their homes, having 
to find refuge with family or friends or in 
temporary accommodation facilities.
IDPs in hazard-prone areas
The prioritisation of return – by the state and 
the international community – between 1999 
and 2005 exacerbated the vulnerability of 
some IDPs, especially Roma IDPs. Those who 
did not want to return and did not benefit 
from financial assistance often settled in at-
risk areas near riverbanks prone to flooding 
or on hillsides that were susceptible to 
landslides, simply building on vacant land. 
Without ownership or other rights to their 
property, many such IDPs are under constant 
threat of eviction by authorities. In addition, 
the use of cheap construction materials and 
unskilled craftsmen has meant that it is the 
most vulnerable IDPs and returnees from the 
conflict 20 years ago who are again prone to 
displacement, this time by natural hazards.2
The National Action Plan on Roma 
Housing calls for the legalising of informal 
settlements and illegally built houses and 
a more favourable legislative framework 
but has yet to be fully implemented3 and 
there is still no state-level regulation on the 
legalisation of informally built housing units. 
Resolution of property disputes for the land 
on which such houses are built remains the 
responsibility of the two ‘entities’ and Brčko 
District at the municipal/cantonal level. 
At the same time, newly displaced Roma 
continue to face discrimination in accessing 
assistance. In interviews conducted with 373 
displaced Roma families in 20 municipalities, 
45% said their homes had been destroyed by 
flooding or landslides in 2014.4 Those who 
had built on public land without permission 
or building permits are not eligible for 
reconstruction assistance due to the legal 
requirement to provide proof of ownership 
of a destroyed property. It is not clear what 
housing assistance, if any, there will be for 
informal settlers and other non-owners.
Prioritise according to need, not cause of 
displacement 
BiH received aid from bilateral donors, 
international organisations and the European 
Union (EU) to respond to the flooding-
induced displacement in 2014. As part of this, 
facilities to house those who were unable 
to remain in their homes were identified. 
Here, in the context of another programme 
(CEBII5) funded by the Council of Europe 
Development Bank to close all collective 
centres, it became important to distinguish 
between shelter for IDPs displaced by the 
conflict and those displaced by the floods 
and landslides. The new shelters became 
known as ‘temporary accommodation 
facilities’ (TAFs) so as not to confuse 
them with the ‘collective centres’ which 
continue to house IDPs from the conflict. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 45
FM
R
 5
0
www.fmreview.org/dayton20September 2015
Where a country experiences multiple 
waves of displacement, the most vulnerable 
should be prioritised. After the initial surge 
of post-flood assistance, many organisations 
became worried that displacement caused 
by the floods would undo progress made 
in returns and local integration of IDPs 
from the conflict, delay work to improve 
living conditions of IDPs in collective 
centres, and damage donor commitments 
to facilitate ‘conflict returns’ (if donors 
decided to assist those displaced in the 
more recent disaster rather than those 
who were displaced 20 years ago). 
This last concern was not unfounded. In 
the immediate aftermath of the floods, the 
Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees 
and the EU approved a diversion of funds 
allocated to end displacement caused by 
the conflict towards those displaced by 
the floods and landslides. There was an 
emphasis on vulnerable populations that 
included ‘Roma and displaced communities’ 
but the requirement to show proof of 
ownership remained (in order to be eligible 
for reconstruction assistance) and there was 
uncertainty as to whether previous assistance 
provided to conflict IDPs would affect 
their eligibility for flood-related assistance. 
There was no official guidance for donors 
or government authorities on this matter.
Eventually, the Ministry of Displaced 
Persons of the Federation of BiH – one of 
the two entities governing BiH – shifted 
funding intended for conflict IDPs and 
used it to prioritise people who had been 
doubly displaced, once by conflict and 
then again by the floods and landslides. 
The biggest question surfaced around 
reconstruction assistance for housing that 
was built informally as there is still no 
legislation or legal regime in place to provide 
reconstruction assistance to those who have 
built informally – primarily Roma IDPs. 
Some progress has been made in that 
municipalities are now able to allocate 
public land free of charge to persons who 
lost their homes in the landslides. Roma 
who meet the eligibility requirements can 
request such assistance, like everyone else, 
but are still required to provide some proof 
of ownership, which many do not have. The 
distribution of free land by the municipality 
does not adequately address their housing 
needs or the specific challenges – such 
as documentation – faced by the Roma 
community. Innovative approaches to 
circumvent all of these challenges are needed. 
Wesli H Turner wesli.turner@gmail.com   
Associate Regional Analyst, Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
www.internal-displacement.org 
1. Bosnia and Herzogovina Recovery Needs Assessment, Floods 14-19 
May, European Union, 19 May 2014  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/floods/rna-
executive-summary.pdf 
2. In addition, many Roma IDPs do not have official IDP status as 
they did not have the identity documents required to register.
3. Government of Bosnia and Herzogovina (2013) Action Plan for 
Roma in the areas of employment, housing and healthcare, p28  
http://tinyurl.com/BiH-Action-plan-Roma-2013 (Bosnian only)
4. IOM (June 2014) Impact of the Floods and Landslides in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the Affected Roma Population: First Assessment Results, 
IOM (June 2014).  
5. See article by Mayne A ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after 
Dayton’, pp8-11.
Photo taken by a Slovenian helicopter crew as they provide assistance to people affected by floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. 
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Prijedor: re-imagining the future 
Damir Mitrić and Sudbin Musić
Public memorialisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today is an act of remembering not just 
those who died in the conflict but also the multi-ethnic reality of earlier times. Articulation of 
this, however, is being obstructed in cities like Prijedor.
The political elites of post-Dayton Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) have carefully 
patrolled their respective histories of ‘what 
happened’ during the war, with school 
curricula, public broadcasting, public 
events and memorial sites on all sides 
mostly narrating an un-nuanced story 
of victim and perpetrator. Imposing an 
embargo on memories of pre-war BiH has 
become an important component of this.
In the north-western town of Prijedor, 
a systematically executed policy of 
ethnic cleansing resulted in the killing of 
3,173 residents at the hands of local Serb 
authorities, with a third executed in the 
three infamous concentration camps of 
Omarska, Karaterm and Trnopolje. 
The signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in November 1995 left Prijedor 
within the jurisdiction of the Republika 
Srpska (RS), with the immediate post-war 
political leadership dominated by those 
who had ‘ethnically cleansed’ the town of 
its non-Serb population.1 Annex 7 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement established the 
right of all refugees and displaced persons 
to return freely to their homes of origin, and 
was generally successfully implemented in 
Prijedor, in contrast to other parts of BiH; 
between 1998 and 2003 some 10,000 Bosniaks 
decided to return to the place of their birth. 
However, only 20% of the original Bosniak 
population has permanently returned. Until 
2007, reclaiming and rebuilding destroyed 
private property had been the primary driver 
of return. Thereafter returns stagnated, 
and many of the returnees decided to move 
across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line into 
the Bosniak-Croat Federation or to join their 
relatives in exile across the globe. Their 
beautifully renovated 
houses stand empty 
in Prijedor for most 
of the year. With an 
ageing population and 
an economy that offers 
no opportunities for 
young people – who 
are increasingly 
abandoning the town 
– Prijedor faces the 
prospect of being 
emptied once again.
Politics of 
memorialisation 
Equally worrying 
is the politically 
sanctioned culture 
of denial of the war 
crimes committed 
against the non-Serb 
population. Local 
Tomašica mass grave, in Prijedor municipality.
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authorities regularly use their political 
power to interfere with or prohibit public 
memorialisation. Most prominently, in May 
2012 Mayor Marko Pavić instructed the 
police to stop planned commemorations 
marking the twentieth anniversary of 
the killing of 266 women and children in 
Prijedor and prohibited a further planned 
gathering on 10th December that year. 
Meanwhile, survivors of the notorious 
Omarska concentration camp are still 
waiting for an official site of remembrance.
In 2004 the local government sold 
the industrial complex of Omarska to the 
world’s biggest steel producer, ArcelorMittal 
Steel, which has then denied access to the 
former concentration camp premises for 
commemoration purposes on a number 
of occasions. Most controversial was the 
company’s refusal to allow survivors access 
to the Omarska complex in 2012 to mark 
the twentieth anniversary of its creation as 
a concentration camp in 1992. Only after 
intense public pressure did the management 
finally allow the proceedings to go ahead.  
The premises of the Omarska complex 
stand for more than just the killing fields 
of a bloody war. As the backbone of pre-
war Yugoslav Prijedor, they also embody 
memories of pre-conflict times. They were 
places where neighbours worked side by side 
to secure the prosperity of the municipality, a 
prosperity shared by all. Thus memorialising 
what happened in 1992 is also an act of 
remembrance of the earlier multi-ethnic 
reality – and it is that re-imagining of the past 
that local authorities are determined to deny.
The impossibility of reconciling unity 
and ethnic cleansing lies at the heart of 
the issue that today’s BiH is facing. How 
could my neighbours have mutated into my 
killers? The question may be impossible to 
answer but its articulation in public spaces 
is a necessary foundation for a future that 
encompasses all the country’s peoples. 
Damir Mitrić d.mitric@latrobe.edu.au 
Post-doctoral researcher, La Trobe University, 
Melbourne. www.latrobe.edu.au
Sudbin Musić sudba8@hotmail.com 
Co-founder, Bridges for the Future Association. 
www.mojprijedor.com 
1. Ito A (2001) ‘Return to Prijedor: Politics and UNHCR’, Forced 
Migration Review issue 10  
www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/textOnlyContent/FMR/10/11.htm
ArcelorMittal Orbit
In a rather bizarre twist, in May 2012 – one month before 
the opening of the London Olympic Games – survivors of 
the Omarska camp accused ArcelorMittal Steel of using iron 
ore deposits from the Prijedor mine in the building of the 
115-metre-high sculpture ArcelorMittal Orbit for the Olympic 
Park in London. Claiming that the iron ore had been dug up 
from the Omarska premises containing bodies of still-missing 
Bosniaks scattered in unmarked mass graves (a claim the 
company denied), survivors appropriated the sculpture as their 
Omarska memorial-in-exile. 
For Bosniak survivors, the Orbit expresses the grief they are 
unable to share publicly in their home town, and casts a longer 
shadow back to a time when they could never have imagined 
the loss to come. Its proximity to the London Olympic flame 
and even its shape trigger memories of the Sarajevo Olympics 
in 1984 – when today’s ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ were 
neighbours in a country which proudly looked outwards to 
the world to showpiece its multi-ethnic society. The Orbit also 
represents the economic devastation of Prijedor experienced 
by today’s unemployed returnees; the iron ore which once was 
the safety net for a prosperous town is now controlled by a 
multinational company.
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Mass evacuations: learning from the past
Caelin Briggs
Twenty years after the evacuations from the Bosnian ‘safe areas’, humanitarians continue to 
struggle with dilemmas around humanitarian evacuations. 
Between 1993 and 1995, humanitarian 
actors made multiple unsuccessful attempts 
to evacuate civilians from the Srebrenica 
enclave. On July 11th 1995, Serb forces broke 
through the southern perimeter of the 
town, triggering a mass movement of 25,000 
people desperate to escape before the enclave 
fell. Srebrenica had been declared a “safe 
area” by the United Nations (UN) but as 
the Serb forces pushed through the streets, 
neither the peacekeepers nor humanitarians 
could protect the civilian population. 
Evacuations and ‘population exchanges’ 
were a regular feature of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and were often facilitated 
by international organisations whose concerns 
about complicity in ethnic cleansing were 
outweighed by the need to find any means to 
protect people from greater harm. Many of 
the facilitated movements from the safe areas 
in July 1995 were as much forcible transfers 
as they were evacuations, and shared similar, 
chilling characteristics: men were separated 
from their families and detained, convoys 
were stopped and searched, and trucks 
containing men were diverted and thousands 
of these men were never seen again.
Parallels: the Balkans and Syria
Twenty years later, humanitarians continue 
to struggle with many of the same challenges 
in evacuations and siege environments. In 
February 2014, the UN was asked to facilitate 
an evacuation from Homs, Syria, the terms 
of which had been decided by the parties to 
the conflict largely without the involvement 
of the humanitarian community. Among 
the conditions imposed was a requirement 
that humanitarians would not evacuate any 
men between the ages of 15 and 55. While 
humanitarians were eventually able to 
negotiate around that particular condition, 
they were not able to prevent hundreds of 
men from being detained for questioning 
and interrogation. The longer these men 
remained in captivity, the more painful and 
obvious the parallels to the Balkans became.
Evacuations of civilians from besieged 
areas can be a critical protection measure 
in the face of imminent violence. In some 
cases, an evacuation may be the only option 
available to save lives. But often, if not 
always, evacuations are also defined by grave 
dilemmas. There may be no good outcome 
available, leaving humanitarians to try to 
determine the least damaging way forward 
in the midst of only bad choices. With this 
in mind it is important for humanitarians 
to reflect on lessons from the Balkans and 
other evacuations in the succeeding two 
decades in order to develop strategies to 
minimise harm. These lessons include:
Don’t wait until it is too late to deal with 
the tough issues: If potential dilemmas and 
complications are not discussed until an 
evacuation is imminent, staff on the ground 
will be left to make fast decisions on their own. 
At an institutional level, organisations should 
discuss common dilemmas and develop 
guidance for their staff. 
Do a careful mapping of potential dilemmas: 
Mapping potential dilemmas is critical in 
helping to manage complications that may 
arise during an evacuation but, perhaps more 
importantly, it can also help humanitarians 
decide whether to proceed with an evacuation 
in the first place. In some circumstances, 
the risks associated with an evacuation may 
outweigh the likely benefits. The determinant 
is not the dilemma itself but the level of risk 
it carries with it, and how this ranks against 
the immediate imperative to relocate the 
population.
Employ a systematic approach to risk 
analysis: Once a contextualised list of 
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Bosnia revisited: a retrospective on the legacy  
of the conflict
Brad K Blitz
It is instructive to review the legacy of both the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
post-war settlement and experience in order to appreciate how this European conflict set the 
stage for major institutional developments in the field of humanitarian protection, and how, 
after 20 years, the lessons which emerged from this experience are being ignored. 
While more than 1.2 million Bosnians still 
have not returned after fleeing the conflict, 
the vast majority successfully received 
refugee status in countries of asylum. 
Germany and Austria took in hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, most of whom were 
given temporary protection for four to five 
years and later either returned to Bosnia 
or moved on to third countries such as 
Australia. Other countries such as Sweden, 
the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom granted refugee status, though in 
smaller numbers. As a result, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) established a large and 
important diaspora which its government 
has turned to in the hope it may assist with 
the economic revival of the country.
In addition to providing international 
protection, the international community 
invested heavily in a programme of political 
possible dilemmas has been developed, 
humanitarian actors should chart the severity 
of each dilemma, how the risk compares to 
the urgency of the evacuation, and whether 
there are possibilities to mitigate the risks. 
This assessment will help the decision on 
whether to proceed with the evacuation and, 
if so, it will support humanitarians to develop 
contingency plans for the best-case, worst-case 
and most likely scenarios. 
Sharing lessons: For high-risk interventions 
like evacuations, there is still some reluctance 
to speak forthrightly about what went well 
and what did not. Given that many of the same 
dilemmas and challenges arise time and again, 
it is imperative that we share lessons learned. 
Conclusion
If civilians are being evacuated, it means 
political leaders have failed to reach an 
agreement, states have failed to protect their 
citizens, and parties to the conflict have 
failed to uphold their obligations under 
international humanitarian law. Evacuations 
are likewise not a solution – they are a 
temporary, life-saving measure to be pursued 
only when other options have been exhausted. 
It is helpful to recall this in order to lend 
perspective on the role of humanitarians in 
such a context. There is a tendency to see a 
humanitarian evacuation as a success and 
solution to a crisis, when in fact it is neither. 
At their best, evacuations can provide short-
term, life-saving protection and buy time for 
leaders to find a solution, but an evacuation in 
and of itself can neither prevent nor respond 
to a breakdown of protection in the long term. 
Humanitarians have an imperative to 
take every possible measure to promote 
the safety and well-being of conflict-
affected communities, including through 
evacuations where necessary. But, ultimately, 
the responsibility for finding a permanent 
resolution to the crisis continues to rest 
with political leaders and the state.
Caelin Briggs caelin.briggs@nrc.no  
Humanitarian Policy and Protection Advisor, 
Norwegian Refugee Council. www.nrc.no 
The Norwegian Refugee Council has recently 
produced a guide called Considerations for 
Planning Mass Evacuations of Civilians in 
Conflict Settings. Please contact NRC Geneva for 
more information nrcgeneva.policy@nrc.ch
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reconstruction. It created a Human Rights 
Chamber, an International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, later, 
special war crimes courts operating within 
the region. It also established the Office for 
the High Representative and saw institutions 
pass from UN to European control 
during a phase of marked supranational 
development and European integration. 
While Europe impressed its design on 
the former Yugoslavia – for example by 
pressing for greater regional cooperation 
and by drafting multi-staged roadmaps that 
would, if followed correctly, open the door 
to European Union accession – BiH emerged 
from the war less as an independent state and 
more visibly an international protectorate. 
The most glaring example of Western 
political interference was the imposition 
of a new constitutional order by means of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which saw 
the re-configured state of BiH, with its 
proliferation of cantons and its division into 
two ‘entities’ (the conjoined Croat-Muslim 
Federation of BiH and a Bosnian Serb mini-
state, Republika Srpska) resemble a cross 
between Belgium and Switzerland. This 
constitutional order, which preserved the 
ethnic division created by the war, was later 
to be condemned by the European Court 
of Human Rights in its ruling on Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina for denying 
Roma, Jews and others from the possibility 
of assuming the highest political office.
Independent post-war BiH looked 
considerably different from the multi-ethnic 
and largely secular republic of the former 
Yugoslavia. The war had robbed it of its 
young, deprived it of a manufacturing base 
and left many without any hope for a better 
future, while the war criminals who had 
incited and participated in the war were 
protected in neighbouring Serbia and, to a 
lesser extent, Croatia. It was only the prospect 
of European accession for Croatia and later 
Serbia that gradually saw these two countries 
View of Sarajevo from its ruined Parliament building, 1996.
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distance themselves from the ethnic Serb 
and ethnic Croat populations in BiH. While 
Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, 
and Serbia is a candidate country awaiting 
accession negotiations, BiH is a generation 
away from Europe. A key fault line remains 
the effective partition of the country. 
One surprising development is the 
economic progress of the Republika Srpska, 
which experienced extreme poverty just 
ten years ago and now enjoys relative 
prosperity, thanks to the country’s mineral 
wealth. One important consequence of 
this has been the further empowerment 
of those in power who place ethnic 
‘purity’ above other considerations, who 
have done little to recapture the human 
capital lost during and after the war years 
but insist rather on full secession. 
Learning from history
Twenty years on, the return project is ready 
for review. While a commitment to return 
was formally written into the Dayton Peace 
Agreement under Annex 7, the untold 
story of BiH’s post-war independence is the 
large numbers of nationals who returned 
but then left again to go back to their host 
countries or to re-emigrate to Australia, the 
US and Canada. The suggestion that return 
would be a ‘durable solution’ is at odds with 
the experience of post-war Bosnia. There 
are, nonetheless, some important lessons 
one can take from the country’s recent 
history, both during and since the war. 
First, the experience of those who, in 
the early stages of the war, either took 
refuge in private accommodation as 
internally displaced persons or who fled 
abroad contrasts markedly with those 
who sought protection from international 
agencies, including the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. And 
all of these had experiences which were 
sharply differentiated from those of 
people who stayed where they were, often 
under siege conditions. Overwhelmingly, 
those who sought refuge in temporary 
accommodation rather than in camps 
were integrated much faster, whether in 
receiving states or within BiH. The fact that 
BiH’s collective centres remain inhabited 
by people displaced by the conflict, some 
twenty years later, is a shameful indictment 
of a policy effectively of encampment.
Second, those who held out hopes of 
justice, both through the International 
Court of Justice and the special tribunals, 
including the ICTY, have been sorely 
disappointed. BiH’s neighbours refused to 
hand over the most significant perpetrators 
of violence and incitors of hate. The lure 
of justice is a powerful and important 
motivating force for refugees and victims 
of conflict but it must not be oversold. 
Third, the prospect of return is 
considerably more complicated to achieve 
than was sold to BiH, its nationals and its 
protectors. The return project has failed to 
revive BiH, and new models of migration 
need to be examined, including the potential 
for greater circular migration and for 
delayed return migration, perhaps at the 
point when people are at retirement age.
The most positive conclusion from the 
Bosnian experience remains the management 
of the humanitarian effort during the war 
and the reception given to more than two 
million people who desperately needed 
protection. From the vantage point of host 
states, this demonstrates that temporary 
and large-scale humanitarian protection 
is possible. The history of humanitarian 
protection in BiH is especially relevant to 
the contemporary horrors of the conflict 
in Syria that has destroyed much of the 
country and caused the displacement of 
more than eight million people. While the 
European Union Member States remain 
in disagreement over the relocation of 
some 60,000 Syrian refugees, the Bosnian 
experience demonstrates that people can be 
effectively protected, resettled and integrated 
in Europe. Cooperation is possible. That must 
be one of the key messages from this tragedy. 
Brad K Blitz brad1@mdx.ac.uk  
Professor of International Politics, Middlesex 
University. www.mdx.ac.uk   
See Blitz B K (Ed) (2006) War and Change in the 
Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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Inconsistency in asylum appeal adjudication
Nick Gill, Rebecca Rotter, Andrew Burridge, Melanie Griffiths and Jennifer Allsopp
New research findings indicate that factors such as the gender of the judge and of the 
appellant, and where the appellant lives, are influencing asylum appeal adjudication.
There is a widespread, and growing, 
expectation that no matter where a person 
seeks asylum, comparable procedures 
and consistent standards of fairness 
will be applied in assessing their claim 
under the Refugee Convention. While 
positive steps have certainly been taken to 
promote consistency at a broad structural 
level, the extent to which it is achieved 
in practice is still largely unclear. 
Initial findings from a three-year 
study by researchers at the University of 
Exeter1 examining asylum determination 
procedures in the UK has found that there are 
considerable differences between the hearing 
centres where asylum applicants’ appeals are 
heard, and significant inconsistencies in the 
practice of judges who decide such appeals. 
Asylum appeals 
Asylum appeals in the UK are heard at one 
of 13 hearing centres scattered across the 
country. Our researchers visited nine of 
the centres, and carried out a quantitative 
survey of 240 hearings at three of these: 
Taylor House, a large and chaotic centre in 
the heart of London; Sheldon Court, a busy, 
medium-sized centre in the UK’s second 
largest city, Birmingham; and Columbus 
House, a fairly quiet centre on the outskirts 
of Newport in south Wales. We spent 
months sitting at the back of court rooms, 
recording the moods, manners and dialogues 
of the actors present and whether certain 
procedures were adhered to in order to 
explore whether the asylum appeals process 
differs between and within hearing centres.
In the UK, claims for asylum are 
considered in the first instance by Home 
Office officials. Around 75% are refused, and 
applicants generally have a right of appeal 
against this decision. Each appeal is heard 
by an immigration judge, and generally 
involves the asylum-seeking appellant 
and their legal representative (if they have 
one), a Home Office representative, and an 
interpreter (where required by the appellant). 
The hearing has a standard structure, 
beginning with an introduction from the 
judge, moving on to examination of the 
appellant and sometimes of witnesses by 
the legal representative and the Home Office 
representative, and culminating in summary 
submissions of legal arguments by both sides. 
Under UK government policy, asylum 
seekers are entitled to accommodation and 
subsistence if they agree to be relocated 
away from London and the South East 
of England, the most densely populated 
part of the country. When they lodge an 
appeal, their hearing is allocated to their 
nearest hearing centre. In other words, 
asylum seekers generally have limited 
choice about where they live, and even less 
choice about where their appeal is heard.
Differences between hearing centres
We encountered striking differences between 
the hearing centres themselves in terms of 
accessibility, local resources, atmosphere 
and facilities. Some, such as Taylor House 
and Sheldon Court, are well connected by 
public transport but others are much more 
difficult to reach, which can pose barriers 
to witnesses, friends and family attending 
the hearing to support the appellant. Some 
appellants told us that they had to get up 
at dawn and scrape together the money for 
expensive peak-time train tickets in order 
to reach some of the hearing centres for the 
scheduled start time of 10am, with fatigue 
then compounding their pre-existing anxiety. 
Most appellants require a consultation 
with their legal representatives immediately 
before their hearing; indeed, in most cases, 
the day of the hearing is the first time the 
appellant and their lawyer will meet. Some 
hearing centres are so busy, however, that 
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demand for consultation rooms outstrips 
supply, and appellants and their legal 
representatives have to conduct the pre-
hearing consultation while sitting, standing 
or even squatting in noisy public waiting 
areas. At Harmondsworth, a hearing centre 
attached to a detention centre, there is only 
one consultation room – a suite with a prison-
style glass barrier between the appellant 
and the visitor. Users report that the two 
parties must shout to hear each other – 
difficult for appellants with health problems 
or when discussing sensitive matters.
Another key difference between the 
hearing centres is the frequency with 
which appellants are able to obtain legal 
representation. Over the past decade 
the UK government has successively cut 
legal aid funding for immigration cases, 
resulting in ‘legal deserts’: areas where 
there are no legal aid immigration and 
asylum solicitors, or only a few suitably 
qualified and accredited lawyers.2 Our 
research suggests that Columbus House 
in Newport is located in a ‘legal desert’: 
25% of the appellants we observed there 
were unrepresented, compared with 
13% at Sheldon Court in Birmingham 
and 6% at Taylor House in London. 
Judges are advised to take an ‘enabling’ 
role with unrepresented appellants but in 
most of the cases we observed this did not 
achieve the aim of giving the appellant a 
fair chance. Although the judge often told 
the appellant that they would have the 
chance to give submissions, they did not 
explain what this meant, or suggest how 
submissions might be structured. As a result, 
appellants tended not to engage with the 
Home Office’s arguments against them but 
simply pleaded for the judge’s sympathy – a 
natural, but legally ineffective, tactic. 
A final key difference between the hearing 
centres is the gender ratio of presiding 
judges. The percentage of hearings we 
observed headed by a female judge was 49% 
at Sheldon Court, 41% at Taylor House and 
19% at Columbus House. This is particularly 
important in light of the correlation between 
the gender of the judge and the conduct 
of the hearing, as we show below.
Differences in adherence to procedures
During the hearings themselves, we examined 
14 key procedures which, according to best 
practice guidelines,3 judges should ordinarily 
carry out to ensure fairness. Such procedures 
relate to transparency, communication and 
accommodating needs, and led us to ask 
questions such as: Does the judge introduce 
themselves and state their independence from 
the Home Office, so that the appellant is aware 
of the role of the Tribunal and the separation 
of judiciary and State? Does the judge check 
the correct pronunciation of names and 
inform the appellant that they can request 
a break, in order to accommodate the needs 
of vulnerable appellants in particular and 
as a sign of respect? Does the judge explain 
the purpose of the hearing and how it will 
proceed, so that the appellant understands 
what to expect and what is expected of them? 
Where an interpreter is present, does the 
judge instruct the appellant in how to use 
the interpreter, and check understanding 
between the two, to ensure successful 
communication? And does the judge explain 
to the appellant that they must say if they 
do not understand anything, so that the 
appellant knows that they can voice problems 
in the hearing and so that misunderstandings 
are less likely to go unnoticed?
Many of these procedures are particularly 
important in the context of asylum, as 
appellants are often vulnerable, unfamiliar 
with the UK legal system, and wary of 
authority due to experiences of persecution 
and injustice in their countries of origin. 
The procedures also have a social value, 
in ensuring that the appellant is treated 
with equality and respect, and is able 
to participate, and a utilitarian value in 
increasing the likelihood that the evidence, 
on which the appellant’s risk on return 
to the country of origin is assessed, will 
be properly adduced and reliable.
Troubling findings
Our analysis produced a number of troubling 
findings. The 14 procedures were carried out 
just over half (55%) of the time. In the case of 
some procedures, most of the judges behaved 
the same way. For example, in almost all 
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cases (98%), judges checked understanding 
between the appellant and the interpreter, 
and in a great number of cases (88%) they 
neglected to inform the appellant that they 
could request a break. However, there was 
more often significant disparity in following 
the procedures, with judges stating their 
independence in around a third of cases (35%), 
explaining that the appellant should say if 
they do not understand anything around half 
the time (53%), and explaining the purpose 
of the hearing (61%) and how it will proceed 
(66%) in about two-thirds of cases. It is when 
some judges follow the procedures and others 
do not that procedural inconsistency emerges. 
An even more worrying finding is that 
the likelihood of these key procedures being 
followed is correlated with extraneous 
factors, such as the gender of the judge and 
appellant. Female judges were more likely 
than male judges to explain the purpose 
of the hearing and how it will proceed, to 
introduce themselves, to check that names 
are correctly pronounced and to make the 
appellant aware that they should say if 
they do not understand anything. Judges 
also more often explained the purpose 
of the hearing, introduced parties, and 
thoroughly checked understanding between 
the interpreter and the appellant when the 
appellant was male rather than female. 
These findings have important 
implications. Inconsistencies in procedure 
undermine faith in the fairness of legal 
processes, and a reduced perception of 
fairness could result in further appeals, 
as appellants seek to challenge what feels 
like an unjust decision. The findings also 
raise questions about whether systems 
of legal determination which rely on 
multiple, geographically dispersed 
centres can be regarded as fair. Lack of 
adherence to procedures in particular 
could lead to erroneous decision making, 
with the grave consequence that asylum 
seekers may face forcible return, to 
face persecution or serious harm. 
Addressing the issues
We advocate increased independent, external 
monitoring and assessment of practice 
in hearings, as has occurred with much 
success for Home Office initial decision 
making. Simply observing and publicising 
judges’ behaviour, as we have done, would 
also help. The geographical disparities 
we have highlighted could be addressed 
through greater communication between the 
hearing centres, such as via regular forums 
which bring together dispersed judges. 
Although broader inequalities, such 
as legal aid cuts and their impacts, need 
to be tackled at a societal level, procedural 
consistency might be improved by the 
provision of clearer guidelines for judicial 
conduct in hearings, such as a checklist that 
summarises the key things that immigration 
judges should do. Furthermore, enhanced 
training could be delivered to judges, 
including by appellants themselves, using 
novel methods such as peer observation 
and judge/appellant role-play to provide 
experiential insights into best practice and 
the consequences of not following it. 
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Sheltering displaced persons from sexual and 
gender-based violence
Julie Freccero
Providing a variety of safe shelter types, each with its own unique strengths and limitations, 
within a single area could help meet the diverse and changing needs of survivors of sexual 
and gender-based violence. 
Men, women and children risk sexual and 
gender-based violence (SGBV) in situations 
of conflict and emergency and during the 
process of flight. Even once they are settled, 
in displacement camps or urban areas, their 
individual insecurity often increases, due to 
factors such as, for example, the breakdown 
of family and community ties, shifting 
gender roles, and limited access to resources, 
police protection and adequate housing. 
The health and psychosocial needs of 
refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) fleeing SGBV can also be urgent and 
complex, resulting from the individual or 
collective harms they have suffered. Yet 
guidance on the provision of safe shelter to 
those fleeing SGBV is surprisingly limited. 
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence 
Interventions in Humanitarian Settings 
offer the most detailed guidance.1 However, 
their brief discussion of safe shelter focuses 
only on camp settings, and lacks concrete 
examples of possible models and of ways to 
extend protection to marginalised groups. 
To address this gap, in late 2011 the 
Sexual Violence Program of the Human 
Rights Center at the University of California, 
Berkeley, undertook the ‘Safe Haven’ study 
of safe shelters serving refugees, IDPs and 
other forced migrants in four countries: 
Colombia, Haiti, Kenya and Thailand. 
The individual safe shelter programmes 
included in the study serve either adult 
survivors of SGBV or adults and children 
combined. They are run by government, 
international NGOs or local civil society 
organisations and vary widely in physical 
form, size and capacity. Some were 
designed specifically to serve refugees or 
IDPs, while others primarily served the 
mainstream population but were open to 
serving displaced persons. In the course 
of the study, researchers developed a 
typology of safe shelter models serving 
refugees and other displaced persons:
  Traditional safe houses: survivors 
live together in a common structure, 
with staff overseeing operation of the 
accommodation.
  Independent living arrangements: 
staff arrange for survivors to be housed 
in separate accommodations (e.g. 
independent flats or hotel rooms) that were 
not built specially for safe shelter purposes. 
  Community hosting arrangements: 
survivors temporarily live in the homes of 
selected community members.
  Protected areas: survivors live in their own 
homes in a protected, enclosed subsection 
of a refugee or IDP camp.
  Alternative purpose entities: survivors 
stay in a setting designed to provide 
services unrelated to safe shelter (e.g. a 
police station, hospital clinic or church).
There were also hybrids that combine 
elements of the above models.2
Traditional safe houses
The safe house was by far the most 
common. In general, traditional safe 
houses are beneficial to residents with 
greater security needs, offering measures 
such as guards, gates, confidential 
locations and rules governing residents’ 
movement and visitors. However, this 
comes at the expense of community 
engagement, mobility and independence. 
Extreme examples are the shelters for 
high-risk IDPs in Colombia fleeing conflict-
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related violence. Residents of these shelters 
reported feeling locked in or imprisoned 
due to the rigid security protocols, police 
patrols and armed escorts accompanying 
survivors to outside services. Exceptions 
are the traditional safe houses run by 
grassroots women’s and migrants’ rights 
organisations in Thailand, which are often 
attached to a community centre offering 
resources, information and social activities. 
This variation of traditional safe house 
seems to strike an effective balance between 
security and resident empowerment.
Traditional safe houses also bring 
strangers to live in close proximity, which 
can result in conflicts related to cleanliness, 
shared resources, unequal power dynamics 
or pre-existing animosity towards members 
of other cultural and ethnic groups.
Independent living arrangements
These arrangements are useful in allowing 
more freedom and independence than other 
models. They also seem to provide more 
confidential or comfortable options for 
members of some marginalised groups who 
have specific needs or do not feel comfortable 
being housed with the general population. 
In Kenya, one programme houses LGBT3 
refugees with protection concerns in low-
profile private apartments around Nairobi, 
where they can live inconspicuously in the 
general community. However, they were 
safe only as long as they did not outwardly 
identify as LGBT. Informants in Thailand 
noted that, given the gender norm that 
“men can protect themselves” and the 
stigma attached to men using safe shelters, 
an independent living arrangement model 
may be more accessible to and culturally 
appropriate for men and teenage boys. 
The main limitation of independent 
living arrangements was the lack of any 
real security provision at housing sites. 
Scattered housing can also be isolating 
and unable to provide the social support 
that many find essential to recovery.
Community host arrangements
The community host system, in which 
survivors stay in the homes of volunteers, 
is an emerging protection strategy. These 
programmes offer survivors the comfort of 
a home setting and the ability to stay within 
their own communities, which can help them 
to maintain supportive relationships with 
friends and family and ease the reintegration 
process. It also fosters a network of survivor 
advocates within the community. 
In Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, two 
community host systems run by international 
NGOs temporarily place survivors in the 
homes of community leaders and volunteers. 
In a camp setting, this model allows for 
a community-based option that neither 
cuts people off from their normal support 
networks nor raises their expectations 
of long-term stays or resettlement. 
• Traditional safe houses: 
• Community host systems:
• Hybrid models: 
 • Independent living arrangements:
• Protected areas
• Alternative purpose entities
• Police Station
• Brush fence perimeter
Kakuma "Protection Area"
Guard
Garden
• Entry
Shelter Types Key: symbols representing each shelter type as defined in the Safe Haven study.
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Community host 
systems are less resource-
intensive and they also 
provide an option for those 
who may not want to take 
the extreme step of leaving 
the community, even 
temporarily. However, 
such systems may not 
be suitable for survivors 
with high security risks, 
particularly in a closed 
camp setting where it is not 
possible to move to another 
area secretly. Host families 
in Colombia expressed 
concerns about their 
own safety when housing 
people in volatile situations with minimal 
security, and some noted that it had a negative 
impact on their own family dynamics. In 
Kenya, survivors and volunteer hosts were 
occasionally attacked, and in other instances 
potential hosts simply refused to accept 
survivors because they feared for their own 
safety. These programmes also depend on a 
community’s awareness of women’s rights 
and approval of survivors seeking protection. 
Protected areas
Protected areas are closed-off sections of a 
refugee camp with enhanced security, where 
at-risk individuals can live with their families 
in their own homes among other families in 
need of protection. In Kakuma refugee camp 
in Kenya, for example, the protected area is 
enclosed by a wire-mesh fence covered in 
thorny branches that shield residents from 
view. Two security guards work at the gate 
and a nearby police station enhances security. 
However, this model posed challenges 
similar to those associated with traditional 
safe houses, including a focus on 
security at the expense of connection to 
the community and tensions resulting 
from strangers of diverse backgrounds 
living together in a congested space. 
Alternative purpose entities 
Alternative purpose entities can provide 
important protection options on a short-
term, emergency basis, such as beds in 
health clinics in Kenya and Thailand, and 
housing at boarding schools in refugee 
camps in Kenya and Thailand. In Kenya, 
a community-run detention centre for 
offenders – known as The Sudanese Cell – 
doubles up as a safe space for survivors.
The primary limitation of alternative 
purpose entities is that they are simply 
not oriented to address the complex needs 
of survivors. In certain cases, they could 
provide temporary security but could not 
address medical or psychosocial needs. In 
other cases, the reverse was true. Findings 
suggest that these models should be used 
only as a short-term, last resort for sheltering 
survivors in emergency situations.
A diversity of options
This typology of safe shelter models can be 
useful in building an evidence base for more 
effective shelter protection and it can serve 
as a framework for analysing trends and 
understanding the strengths and limitations 
of different programme types. The study 
identified a number of critical factors for 
the success of safe shelter programmes, 
regardless of type. These include:
  how the community perceives the shelter 
  the provision of adequate security and 
psychosocial support for both residents 
and staff
Safe Haven shelter in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, 2011.
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  a survivor-centred approach in which 
survivors are involved in all levels of 
decision making
  the development of  transition strategies 
for residents to be able to move on as early 
as possible.
  a shelter’s level of coordination with other 
shelters and other service providers in the 
area. 
Having a diversity of safe shelter options 
available is ideal to accommodate the range of 
security needs as well as individuals’ desire 
for independence and community connection. 
Understanding the diversity of possible 
programme models – and making this range 
available within a single camp or community 
– can enable survivors to transfer to more 
appropriate safe shelters as their needs and 
preferences evolve. More in-depth, rigorous 
evaluation of safe shelter programmes is 
urgently needed to confirm which models 
work well in different circumstances. 
Julie Freccero juliefreccero@berkeley.edu 
Associate Director of the Sexual Violence 
Program at the Human Rights Center, University 
of California, Berkeley, School of Law. www.law.
berkeley.edu/centers/human-rights-center/ 
This article is based on findings of the Safe 
Haven study of the Human Rights Center. Julie 
Freccero was lead researcher and author for the 
Thailand case study and co-author of the four-
country comparative report. The Safe Haven 
report series is available at  
http://tinyurl.com/SafeHaven-BerkeleyLaw 
1. http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_
files/tfgender_GBVGuidelines2005.pdf  
These Guidelines are currently in the process of revision.
2. In the full reports of the Safe Haven series a sixth category of 
‘hybrid models’ is also discussed.
3. Lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender.
Changing how we measure success in resettlement
Justin S Lee, Suzie S Weng and Sarah Ivory
Refugees should be treated not as poor, traumatised foreigners but as strong and capable 
people who can be resources in their countries of resettlement.
While it is evident why resettlement 
countries are interested in the self-reliance 
of refugees, these are not necessarily 
the same benchmarks of success against 
which refugees measure themselves. By 
investing in understanding more about 
how refugees define their own success, we 
can improve our capacity to evaluate and 
adapt programmes intended to support 
refugees in their transition into permanent 
resettlement. Furthermore, by reframing 
our definition of what makes an outcome 
successful, we have the opportunity to build 
on the strengths of the refugees themselves, 
and to improve our capacity to demonstrate 
not just a reduction in the perceived burden 
on receiving communities but also the 
value that resettled refugees can add.
Nearly all of the 15 permanently 
resettled refugees interviewed on the 
subject of how individuals define their 
own success reported that they measure 
success not by their individual economic 
self-sufficiency but by their ability to ‘give 
back’ to their communities and to maintain 
a connectedness to their culture of origin. 
Though this finding does not necessarily 
reflect the sentiments of all refugees, it 
does offer insight into important gaps 
between how receiving countries measure 
success (through employment statistics) 
versus how those receiving services in 
these countries measure success.   
Supporting resilience
Resilience is often cited as the main 
determining characteristic for successful 
integration into a new community and, in 
that context, is often seen as a characteristic 
required of the individual alone. However, 
if resilience is “…the capacity of individuals 
to access resources that enhance their well-
being and the capacity of their physical and 
social ecologies to make those resources 
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available in meaningful ways…”,1 it also 
requires a resettlement country to share 
the responsibility for the level of success 
that a refugee community achieves by 
ensuring that opportunities and resources 
exist which support long-term success. 
For example, the United States (US), 
the world’s largest resettlement country, 
evaluates programmes almost entirely 
based on a single outcome – rapid early 
employment. This can be effective in 
demonstrating financial self-sufficiency 
and elimination of public dependency; 
however, this alone does not guarantee that 
the foundation is set for resilience and long-
term success. Imagine asking not just “what 
is the minimum qualification for success?” 
but instead, “how do refugees define their 
own success, and what impact does this 
have on our community?” Asking these 
questions might, for example, highlight 
instances in which stepping stones provided 
by receiving communities to achieve short-
term success serve as stumbling blocks for 
longer-term positive results. For example, 
finding employment within the first three 
to four months in a new place might 
achieve immediate self-sufficiency but 
upon further investigation we might find 
that it limits refugees’ access to language 
training – training that might have far more 
added benefit in the long term for potential 
upward mobility in the job market. 
Strengths-based perspective
Resettlement countries that are able 
to recognise the inherent assets and 
capabilities that refugees have developed 
through their own personal experience 
and who use this information to design 
programmes that bolster rather than 
restrict these talents will benefit most. 
Although, at the level of bureaucratic 
systems, infusing policy with a person-
centred strengths perspective is a daunting 
prospect, it is much less so at the practitioner 
level. At this level it is already happening 
but is not well supported or accounted for 
in the outcomes. One example is that of 
a young refugee who had come to the US 
as an unaccompanied refugee minor. His 
caseworker recognised the young man’s 
capacity for leadership and his passion for 
helping others in the programme; with 
her help, the young man started a support 
group for newly resettled unaccompanied 
minors. This blossomed into a valuable 
venue where young refugees could support 
one another, share practical knowledge, 
develop personal relationships and begin 
to heal their sense of community and 
belonging. In this instance, the resettlement 
agency was able to support an environment 
in which the refugee’s strengths could be 
shared with his community in a meaningful 
way. Had the case worker focused only on 
that individual’s deficits and trauma, this 
outcome would not have been possible.
Giving back 
When host countries measure the success 
of resettlement only in terms of economic 
self-sufficiency, a great resource is being 
overlooked – the drive and dedication of 
resettled refugees to give back to their 
communities, countries and cultures of 
origin. Some of the resettled refugees 
volunteered with a resettlement agency, 
some sent money home to relatives still in 
refugee camps, and some started service 
and non-profit organisations that have an 
impact on thousands of displaced people 
globally. So important was the commitment 
to ‘giving back’ that they described it as 
a major motivating factor for gaining an 
education and achieving a high-paying job.
It is clear that newcomers who achieve 
their potential as measured against 
their own definitions of success have 
positive contributions to make in their 
resettlement communities and further 
afield. Effectively leveraging this potential, 
however, requires receiving countries to 
create environments in which resilience is 
nourished and strengths are recognised. 
One thing that receiving countries can do 
to support this is to expand the benchmarks 
by which we measure success in the first 
place. New measurements that take into 
account a broader spectrum of successful 
integration would provide opportunities to 
demonstrate the positive impact of refugee 
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Young Afghans facing return
Kim Robinson and Lucy Williams
A project in the UK aiming to prepare young men for return to Afghanistan through an 
assisted voluntary return programme was unsuccessful. A different, longer-term approach 
might have been more appropriate and more effective.
Unaccompanied children claiming asylum 
in the United Kingdom (UK) live in the 
precarious position of having to learn to 
adapt to their host country while knowing 
that they may eventually be returned to the 
country they have fled from. Local Authority 
Social Services departments are charged 
with their care under the Children Act 1989 
but receive no funding once the children 
turn 18. At this stage, the young people’s 
asylum claims are reviewed and in many 
cases they are deemed not to qualify for 
continued asylum. This article examines the 
case of six young people who, on reaching 
18, were no longer eligible for care from 
Social Services and were identified as Appeal 
Rights Exhausted Care Leavers (ARECL) 
and thus subject to removal from the UK. 
The Positive Futures Project was 
developed in recognition of the needs and 
vulnerabilities of young people facing the 
prospect of enforced return to Afghanistan. 
The basic aim of the project was to encourage 
these young Afghans to volunteer for 
Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) by giving 
them some extra training and skills that 
would be useful once back in Afghanistan. 
However, the source of the Project’s funding 
(the government’s Return and Reintegration 
Fund) and its connection to the Home 
Office meant that potential trainees were 
supposed to apply for AVR before they 
would be eligible for the training course. 
AVR is one of a range of voluntary 
return schemes promoted by the UK 
government. AVR offers cash and support 
to ease the integration of migrants back 
into their countries of origin; such schemes 
are common but are controversial in that 
their ‘voluntary’ nature can be disputed 
in cases when migrants would prefer 
to stay but are obliged to return. 
Existing evidence from our research 
and other studies of young Afghans 
presents a clear picture that young ‘Care 
Leavers’ do not want to return.1 Many 
cannot imagine a future in Afghanistan 
and the continuing state of unrest in the 
country makes return an uncertain and 
frightening prospect. In addition, many 
young people have lost contact with family 
members and friends. Legal challenges to 
forced return are sometimes successful 
and, as of April 2015, the legality of charter 
flights taking Afghans back to Afghanistan 
is under challenge in the UK courts.
“They said we must sign and go back…”
The Project did not succeed in persuading 
any of this group of young people to apply 
resettlement to the communities that receive 
them. This could in turn increase support 
and resources aimed at improving those 
outcomes and thus supporting programmes 
that improve the environments into which 
we receive refugees. Ultimately, this 
would create a positive feedback loop that 
would make resettlement programmes 
stronger and more sustainable over time. 
1. Ungar M (2008) ‘Resilience Across Cultures’, British Journal 
of Social Work, Volume 38. http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org/
content/38/2/218.full
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for AVR. What was offered to them – 
training and the highest level of financial 
reintegration support available – did not 
outweigh their fears and concerns. A 
session with the Choices team, the NGO 
responsible for explaining AVR in the UK, 
was only scheduled at the end of the first 
week – when it became clear that the young 
people had not fully understood that they 
must commit to return to Afghanistan in 
order to receive the training. They all left 
the programme, angry and disappointed at 
how things had turned out. We were told:
“We were thinking we can go to college, we can 
do anything, we can learn – but then they said we 
must sign and go back. I know that, I’ve been in 
detention … they can give some money and you 
can go back to Afghanistan to live there. What am I 
going to do with that money if I haven’t got family? 
If I go somewhere and people see I’ve got money, 
they will steal it from me. They might kill me as 
well. It’s not right.”
Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children 
need improved care, support and educational 
opportunities to help them prepare better for 
adulthood and to reduce the possibility of 
detention, destitution and deportation. More 
broadly, the study highlighted a complex 
area of immigration policy which, we argue, 
could be improved if local authorities’ 
obligations as ‘corporate parent’ focused 
more on the needs and futures of the young 
person than on wider political issues.
Recommendations 
Our recommendations challenge the 
culture of increasingly punitive migration 
controls and argue that public spending 
on these children could prevent longer-
term problems for their well-being, 
political engagement and settlement.
AVR and incentivising return: There needs 
to be discussion early on in the establishment 
of care for young people in relation to 
preparation for potential return, particularly in 
terms of accessing education for future careers 
and business opportunities.
Comprehensive training: With a longer-term 
view, training could be incorporated while 
they are still in care as minors. This could 
be jointly funded, through both the care and 
the training budgets, enabling support staff 
to work more closely with young people to 
overcome barriers such as finding suitable 
school places and access to continuing 
education.
A cultural approach: Encouraging a sense 
of belonging – either in Afghanistan or 
the UK – and bi-culturalism would help 
them to think positively about returning to 
Afghanistan. This could include literacy and 
age-appropriate fluency in their language of 
origin and building connections and social 
networks in Afghanistan. Family-tracing 
services could also be used more proactively 
to develop the few links these young people 
may have.
Furthermore, the funding for Care 
Leavers who are classified as Appeal 
Rights Exhausted (and therefore eligible to 
be deported) remains contentious. Local 
Authorities are financially responsible for 
providing care while the Home Office’s role 
is that of an enforcement agent. The resulting 
tension over financial liability needs to be 
resolved if more holistic approaches to the 
care and support of these young people are 
to be feasible. Equipping a young person 
with cultural skills appropriate to a future 
in the UK as well as in their country of 
origin has the potential to support them in 
building positive futures as contributing 
citizens wherever their lives take them.
Kim Robinson kim.robinson@deakin.edu.au  
Lecturer in Social Work, School of Health and 
Social Development, Deakin University. 
www.deakin.edu.au 
Lucy Williams L.A.Williams@kent.ac.uk 
Independent Researcher and Senior Visiting 
Research Fellow, University of Kent. 
www.kent.ac.uk/sspssr/
1. See for example Gladwell C (2013) ‘No longer a child: from the 
UK to Afghanistan’, Forced Migration Review issue 44  
www.fmreview.org/detention/gladwell; Schuster L and Majidi N 
(2014) ‘Deportation Stigma and Re-migration’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Vol 41 (4). 
http://tinyurl.com/JEMS-2014-Schuster-Majidi
General articles
FM
R
 5
0
September 2015
62
www.fmreview.org/dayton20
A fragmented landscape of protection 
Roger Zetter
Changing concepts of protection and a growing diversity in the practice of protection, 
and in the range of humanitarian and other actors doing protection work, have led to a 
fragmentation of effective protection for forced migrants.
Over the last decade, in response to 
the changing dynamics and increasing 
complexity and unpredictability of forced 
and irregular migration, there has been 
a significant remaking of the concept of 
protection, a diversification of the practice 
of protection and an expansion in the range 
of humanitarian and other actors doing 
protection work. In principle, at least, these 
developments have the potential to reduce the 
risks to which forced migrants are exposed 
and their vulnerability to those risks, and 
to allow people to flee conflict, violence 
and human rights abuses in security. 
However, this has led to a fragmented 
landscape of protection which is conceptually 
problematic, and which has divergent 
standards, procedures and governance. The 
result has been increasing vulnerability of 
forced migrants and a protection regime 
that lacks coherence and fairness.
Remaking protection – changing norms and 
practice
Some progress has been made in developing 
norms of protection. At the 2005 United 
Nations (UN) World Summit, the doctrine 
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was 
adopted,1 a far-reaching attempt to protect 
people exposed to the extreme human rights 
abuses that lead to forced displacement; 
however, the international community has 
stopped short of giving it any teeth and 
R2P lies fallow. With norms endeavouring 
to keep pace with the changing dynamics 
of forced displacement, especially for those 
who do not fall within the provisions of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, we have 
seen adaptations such as subsidiary forms 
of protection – ‘humanitarian protection’, 
‘complementary protection’ and ‘temporary 
protection’. And a recent report from 
the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights advocates and refines the 
norms of protection which should be 
provided at borders and entry points.2 
Whereas this normative development of 
protection has been rather limited, practice 
has developed and diversified both rapidly 
and extensively. While the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues 
to lead the development of Protection 
Standards, a wide range of non-governmental, 
intergovernmental and UN humanitarian 
organisations have developed strategies for 
emergency humanitarian evacuation and 
basic civilian protection in war zones. Self-
protection is widely advocated by a number 
of NGOs. The Global Protection Cluster 
Syrian refugees are rescued in the Mediterranean Sea by crew of the 
Italian ship, Grecale. March 2014.
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has played an important role in setting and 
disseminating protection standards and 
policies and in capacity building. For urban 
areas, protection tools and instruments 
are being refined. Within Europe the 2013 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 
although heavily criticised, is a wide-ranging 
instrument seeking to ensure consistent 
protection standards and performance in all 
European member states. 
The normative protection gap for third-
country nationals indirectly caught up 
in conflict countries – so-called stranded 
migrants such as the 800,000 migrant 
workers and migrants in transit in Libya in 
2010 – has been pragmatically filled by joint 
International Organization for Migration-UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees action. The 
European Commission has adopted Regional 
Development and Protection Programmes, 
a potentially valuable instrument adding 
to the quality and reliability of protection 
for forced migrants in regions of origin. 
Given this expanding portfolio of 
protection standards and practice, it may 
seem that progress has been made but 
this is primarily for refugees, not the 
wider categories of migrants who are 
forcibly displaced but who do not meet 
the normative definition of a refugee. 
Thus there are significant conceptual 
and operational questions which suggest 
that protection space and the quality 
of protection (discussed below) have 
diminished, and that international norms 
and standards have been sacrificed to 
operational and political imperatives, creating 
a fragmented landscape of protection. 
From protection norms to protection 
management
Alongside the ‘soft-law’ normative initiatives 
mentioned above, there is now a much 
sharper focus on the policies and operational 
instruments for protection. This reflects 
and reinforces a profound transformation 
in the underlying rationale and practice of 
protection. This is the transformation from 
norms-based principles to the ‘management’ 
of protection, linked to a reconfiguration of 
institutional structures and responsibilities. 
One example is within the European Union 
(EU), where the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM – the EU’s principal 
strategic policy) and the CEAS reveal the 
way the management of protection has 
displaced the search for normative conditions 
of protection that might address the new 
dynamics of international migration.
In other words, protection has been 
appropriated by international agencies and 
humanitarian actors as an institutionalised 
and operational task. The consequent loss 
of the normative supremacy of protection is 
potentially one of the most critical outcomes 
of the way in which the protection challenges 
posed by the contemporary dynamics of 
forced migration have been addressed.
Conceptual diversity and uncertainty
There is increasing debate, but little 
consensus, as to whether protection should 
continue to be ‘status-based’ or whether 
‘needs-based’ or ‘rights-based’ protection 
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might better address the diverse range 
of vulnerabilities and risks which forced 
migrants face. Status-based determination 
– contingent on international legal and 
normative frameworks such as the 1951 
Convention which designates certain 
categories of forced migrant and as laid out 
in the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement – has dominated both the 
protection discourse and operational 
considerations. But the disaggregation 
of protection challenges into constituent 
statuses does not accurately address 
contemporary protection needs. 
By contrast, some humanitarian actors, 
for example the ICRC, contend that there is 
a demand for protection from a wide range 
of threats – such as direct physical violence, 
coercion and exploitation and deliberate 
deprivation – irrespective of the category or 
normative status of the individual. Indeed, 
with violent conflict and forced migration 
taking on new manifestations, these agencies 
argue that protection should be predicated 
on a needs-based approach which responds 
to these vulnerabilities, and not on a specific 
legal status. Another line of argument, 
promoted by some humanitarian NGOs and 
the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, proposes a 
rights-based approach for recognising and 
determining the protection entitlements of 
forced migrants. In other words, the right 
to protection, like many other rights, is an 
entitlement that belongs to all human beings 
and most certainly to forcibly displaced 
people. It is not contingent on a particular 
legal (or social or political) status. 
Irrespective of the basis for protection, 
all three approaches point to the need for a 
framework that is as inclusive as possible but 
this aspiration, as yet, remains fragmented. 
Structural ambiguity of protection
There is a distinct and growing dichotomy 
between the concepts and practice of 
protection in regions of mass forced 
displacement in the Global South, compared 
to the Global North where regimes that 
simply do not allow in refugees, asylum 
seekers and other forced migrants are 
becoming increasingly embedded. From 
a single starting point of international 
legal and normative standards set out in 
international law, a twin-track protection 
model has now emerged. Within regions 
that generate most of the world’s forced 
migrants, improved standards and expanded 
protection capacity are promoted by external, 
usually Global North, actors. These same 
post-industrial countries are simultaneously 
giving diminished access to fair asylum 
procedures and showing a progressively 
reduced commitment to refugee resettlement. 
Nowhere is this dichotomy more evident 
than in the regime of the EU. The EU has 
enabled extra-territorial processing of 
migrants and asylum seekers through its 
Mobility Partnerships and Readmission 
Agreements with neighbouring and transit 
countries, a process known as ‘rebordering’. 
Meanwhile, closer to Europe itself, a 
battery of instruments and interventions, 
mainly in southern Member States and the 
Mediterranean, has been created to enhance 
security of the common external border – 
Frontex, EUROSUR, EASO3 and The Task 
Force for the Mediterranean. Constructed to 
manage the security of Europe and to meet 
the challenge of mixed migration flows, 
this process has relentlessly diminished the 
quality of protection for forced migrants.
This twin-track approach to protection is 
further evidence of the fragmented landscape. 
Fragmented practice and institutional 
delivery
The proliferating protection practices noted 
above lack a coherent, systematic framework 
or over-arching normative architecture 
of support. Instead, an extensive array 
of policies, instruments and operational 
responses has been created which are  
largely reactive and often pragmatically 
tailored to specific protection contexts and 
protection gaps. 
Even where coherence and convergence is 
the aim, as with the CEAS, there is still vast 
policy and operational divergence, as a recent 
Eurostat report noted.4 There is divergence 
in procedures (reception, admission, 
status determination, nationality and age 
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verification tests, appeals and removals) and 
divergence in standards and practices (for 
example, access to legal advice, detention, 
deportation and temporary protection). 
This lack of coherent practice is 
paralleled by the lack of a comprehensive 
institutional response to protection. Many 
of the initiatives have been developed by 
international agencies, governments, the 
EU or humanitarian NGOs on an individual 
basis to meet their specific institutional 
goals, programming strategies or political 
priorities. What is significant here is that 
whilst the international duty to protect rests 
with a very small number of agencies such as 
UNHCR and the ICRC, many humanitarian 
organisations, notably NGOs, now include 
protection in their response to forced 
migration almost as if they have a mandate 
to do so. Many humanitarian organisations 
now have specialised protection staff and 
well-developed policies and strategies 
on protection. It could be argued that 
this plurality of protection better tailors 
protection activity to particular situations 
and needs, and to the capacity of the actor. 
However the impact of this proliferation 
of protection has been to reinforce the 
disaggregated response to contemporary 
protection challenges and thus the 
fragmentation of the normative basis  
of protection. 
The politicisation of protection
Finally, the most disturbing evidence of 
the fragmentation of protection is the 
highly politicised milieu within which 
protection is now located, far removed 
from the normative precepts on which it 
was originally based. Protection has, in 
effect, been co-opted and instrumentalised 
to serve national interests and a political 
discourse which reinforces the securitisation 
of migration and asylum (predominantly 
in post-industrial countries) at the 
expense of the rights and protection of 
migrants. The fact that protection now lies 
at the cross-over of human rights, legal 
and normative precepts, and politics is 
potentially the most disturbing evidence for 
the fragmented landscape of protection. 
Nowhere are the issues of rebordering 
and the protection for forced migrants 
so highly politicised in public discourse 
as in Europe in relation to international 
migration, mixed migration, mobility between 
European countries, and asylum seekers 
and refugees. National elections, elections to 
the European Parliament in 2014, and rising 
xenophobia all provide ample evidence of 
this. Only Australia rivals the EU in the 
fragmentation of protection brought about 
by contemporary political discourse.
Conclusion
Instead of enhanced protection, this 
fragmented landscape has resulted in a 
protection regime that lacks coherence 
and fairness and in a growing protection 
crisis, especially at Europe’s borders. 
As a consequence, forced migrants are 
increasingly vulnerable and their dignity 
and rights are less and less respected. 
How to develop and adapt protection 
norms and practices that respond to 
profoundly different patterns and dynamics 
of population displacement in the 
contemporary world, compared with the 
situation when the normative principles and 
international frameworks were originally 
established, is the challenge that remains. 
Roger Zetter roger.zetter@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
Emeritus Professor, Refugee Studies Centre, 
University of Oxford. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk 
This article draws on the analysis of a recent 
study for the Swiss Federal Commission on 
Migration.5
1. www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf 
2. OHCHR (2014) OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines 
on Human Rights at International Borders.  
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/A-69-CRP-1_en.pdf 
3. Frontex: European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union; EUROSUR: European External Border 
Surveillance System; EASO: European Asylum Support Office.
4. Eurostat (2014) Asylum Statistics. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Asylum_statistics
5. Zetter R (2014) Protecting Forced Migrants – A State of the Art 
Report of Concepts, Challenges and Ways Forward  
www.ekm.admin.ch/ekm/fr/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-12-18.
html
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Annual Harrell-Bond Lecture
Oxford: 4th November 2015, 5pm  
 “We do not want to become refugees” –  
Human mobility in the age of climate change
Professor Walter Kälin (Envoy of the Chairmanship 
of the Nansen Initiative, and Professor of 
Constitutional and International Law, University 
of Bern) will give the 2015 Annual Harrell-Bond 
lecture. Disaster displacement is one of the 
big humanitarian challenges of our times and 
is likely to increase significantly in the context 
of climate change. Building on the work of the 
Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-border 
displacement, the lecture will explore different tools 
available to address displacement and other forms 
of disaster-related human mobility.  
Location: Oxford University Museum of Natural 
History, Oxford OX1 3PW.  
Email anneli.chambliss@qeh.ox.ac.uk to reserve 
a place. For more details, visit www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
events/2015-annual-harrell-bond-lecture.
New appointments at the RSC
Dr Will Jones has been appointed Departmental 
Lecturer in Politics and Forced Migration for one 
year (as sabbatical cover for Professor Matthew 
Gibney). He will continue to work with Alexander 
Betts on the political life of refugees in Africa, 
including their forthcoming book The Animators: 
How Diasporas Mobilise to Contest Authoritarianism 
(Cambridge University Press). 
Georgia Cole has been appointed as the new Joyce 
Pearce Junior Research Fellow (in association with 
Lady Margaret Hall). Her appointment is for three 
years. She will be continuing her research on the 
politics of refugee cessation in relation to Rwandan 
and Eritrean refugees, as well as beginning a new 
project on the ‘value of refugee status’.
Dr Leïla Vignal will be joining the RSC for two years 
on a Marie Curie Fellowship. As a geographer, she 
will be working on a number of projects relating to 
mapping the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, 
both in the region and in Europe. 
Recent publications
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications 
Refugee Innovation: Humanitarian innovation that 
starts with communities 
Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Nina Weaver  
(July 2015)
‘A critical approach to the production of academic 
knowledge on refugee integration in the global 
North’, RSC Working Paper Series, 109  
Christina Kovacs (June 2015)
Departure of Dr Kirsten McConnachie
After three years at the RSC as the Joyce Pearce 
Junior Research Fellow, Dr Kirsten McConnachie has 
taken up a position in the University of Warwick’s 
School of Law.
During her time at the RSC, Dr McConnachie 
worked primarily on a comparative study of security 
and self-governance strategies among refugees 
from Myanmar in Southeast Asia. In 2015 she 
was jointly awarded the 2015 Socio-Legal Studies 
Association Early Career Book Prize for her book 
Governing Refugees: Justice, Order and Legal 
Pluralism (Routlege, 2014), which examines themes 
of community governance, order maintenance and 
legal pluralism in the context of refugee camps 
on the Thailand-Burma border. More recently, Dr 
McConnachie has been writing about Southeast 
Asia’s migrant boat crisis, highlighting the need for 
ASEAN and global involvement in resolving Rohingya 
statelessness and the discrimination against them. 
See (May 2015) https://theconversation.com/
south-east-asias-migrant-boat-crisis-is-a-global-
responsibility-41698. 
Professor Dawn Chatty elected Fellow of the  
British Academy
We are delighted to 
announce that Dawn 
Chatty, Professor of 
Anthropology and 
Forced Migration and 
former Director of 
the Refugee Studies 
Centre, has been 
elected a Fellow of 
the British Academy. 
Professor Chatty is 
among 42 highly 
distinguished UK 
academics from 
18 universities elected as Fellows in 2015 in 
recognition of their outstanding research. 
Professor Chatty is a social anthropologist whose 
ethnographic interests lie in the Middle East, 
particularly with nomadic pastoral tribes and 
refugee young people. 
FMR Podcasts
All the articles in this issue are 
available as podcasts on the FMR 
website and also on iTunesU. Click on 
the icon to view FMR podcasts, or visit 
http://tinyurl.com/iTunesU-FMR.
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‘Destination: Europe’ 
The December issue of FMR will focus on 
‘Destination: Europe’. The plight of migrants and 
refugees on the Mediterranean Sea has made 
frequent headline news, triggering impassioned 
debate among Europe’s citizens as well as its 
politicians. Meanwhile, growing numbers are  
travelling to Europe by overland routes through 
the Balkans, triggering different challenges and 
protection concerns. This issue will discuss the 
complexities of the European asylum debate and 
place it in its broader context. For more details, see 
www.fmreview.org/destination-europe. 
‘While Europe squabbles, people die’
Professor Alexander Betts, Director of the RSC, has 
been interviewed recently on a number of occasions 
about the current Mediterranean/Europe refugee 
and migrant ‘crisis’. Listen, for example, to an 
interview with the BBC World Service:   
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/2018while-europe-
squabbles-people-die2019-alexander-betts.
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We would also like to thank all those who have 
supported the production and dissemination of FMR 
by making individual donations through our online 
giving site at www.fmreview.org/online-giving 
Thank you to all FMR's donors in 2014-2015
FMR is wholly dependent on external funding to 
cover all of the project’s costs, including staffing. 
We are deeply appreciative to all of the following 
donors for their support and collaboration. 
FMR International Advisors 
Advisors serve in an individual capacity and do  
not necessarily represent their institutions.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina: problems and progress  
in the return process
Carl Hallergård 
While the return of people displaced by the 1992-
95 war is an explicit objective of the international 
community, only 15% have so far returned to their 
places of origin.
Managing the return of refugees to Bosnia  
and Herzegovina
Richard Jacquot 
In the early stage of the war, European nations 
reluctantly agreed to provide refuge to those displaced 
by the war but warned that the refugees would have 
to return as soon as the war ended. Return, however, 
would be difficult for several reasons.
April 2000, FMR 7  
www.fmreview.org/land-and-property-issues 
At the heart of the return process: solving property 
issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Catherine Phuong
The Dayton Peace Agreement explicitly put property 
issues at the heart of the return process and the 
overall peace framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The rehabilitation of homes and return of 
minorities  
to Republika Srpska 
Guy Hovey
The return of IDPs from minority communities 
generates many lessons and raises policy questions. 
October 2001, FMR 11 
www.fmreview.org/return-to-peace 
Problems or partners? Working with women to  
rebuild the Balkans
Rachel Wareham and Diana Quick
Why have post-war reconstruction initiatives treated 
women as passive recipients of aid rather than as 
active partners?
Bosnia and Herzegovina – no future without 
reconciliation
Walpurga Englbrecht
The three phases of reconciliation are not yet 
completed in Bosnia: reconciliation is impossible until 
the truth is known.
Discontent with assistance to the Bosnian  
return process
Guy Hovey
How sustainable are minority returns? What do the 
displaced themselves think of the return process and 
the programmes designed to facilitate return?
September 2004, FMR 21  
www.fmreview.org/return-reintegration 
Restitution of land and property rights
Anne Davies
Without property restitution, perceptions of injustice 
are perpetuated and underlying conflicts remain 
unresolved.
Post-conflict property restitution in Croatia and  
Bosnia and Herzegovina: legal rationale  
and practical implementation
Rhodri Williams
A human-rights based approach to post-conflict 
property restitution is likely to produce results that are 
more consistent, fair, effective and sustainable than 
those based purely on the ‘right to return’.
September 2004, FMR Supplement  
www.fmreview.org/house
Housing reconstruction in Bosnia: field realities
Ana Povrzenic
Housing reconstruction is not just a question of 
building houses. It is about return and restoring the 
right to return to all those who lose this right during 
conflict.
September 2009, FMR 33  
www.fmreview.org/protracted 
Unfinished business: UNHCR and IDPs in Bosnia  
and Herzegovina 
Erin Mooney and Naveed Hussain
Fourteen years after the war’s end, renewed national 
and international efforts are needed to complete the 
work of securing durable solutions for IDPs.
Local integration for refugees in Serbia
Miloš Teržan and Dejan Kladarin
By paying particular attention to the promotion of 
livelihoods and self-reliance, UNHCR hopes to be able 
to phase out the long-standing assistance programme. 
When ‘temporary’ lasts too long
Erin Mooney
Though intended as temporary places of shelter, 
collective centres often become a place where IDPs or 
refugees stay for years, even decades. 
www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Still worth reading...
Articles on post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina previously published in FMR
